Local Government Studies

When accountability fails to bite: governance, democracy and the 2026 Tower Hamlets elections

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Dr Gulay Icoz, Visiting Research Fellow, Middlesex University London

In theory, the 2026 Tower Hamlets local elections should have been a test of democratic accountability in action. The borough entered election year under active statutory intervention. A Best Value Inspection published in November 2024 had documented serious governance failings under Mayor Lutfur Rahman’s Aspire administration: weak internal controls, a culture of concentrated executive authority, poor transparency, and slow responses to statutory recommendations. A further written ministerial statement in January 2026 confirmed ongoing failures and deteriorating financial governance. In March 2026 — just two months before polling day — the Secretary of State escalated the intervention, granting ministerial envoys enhanced powers to step in directly if the council continued to breach its Best Value Duty.

Then voters went to the polls and Aspire won 33 of 45 council seats. Lutfur Rahman was re-elected as Executive Mayor for a third time. Labour was reduced to five seats — its lowest total in the borough’s history.

I stood as the Labour candidate for Bethnal Green West in those elections. What I observed — during the campaign and in the results — reveals a deeper tension between statutory accountability and community-level democratic legitimacy: one with implications that reach well beyond Tower Hamlets.

The structural picture

The results reveal a distortion that deserves wider attention. Aspire secured 73 per cent of council seats with just over 32 per cent of the vote. Labour and the Green Party each received just under 23 per cent of the vote, yet each won only 11 per cent of seats. In ward after ward, the combined Labour and Green vote exceeded Aspire’s total — yet the block voting system used in multi-member wards — where each voter casts as many votes as there are seats and the top candidates win — converted vote fragmentation into a decisive seat bonus for the incumbent. This is sometimes called plurality block voting, and it rewards coordinated slate-voting, which incumbent parties with strong voter loyalty are structurally better placed to exploit.

The ward-level picture sharpens this further. In Bethnal Green West, Labour entered polling day with an estimated core vote of around 540; Aspire’s coordinated bloc was already three times that size, with split votes running into the thousands. Green candidates who had run no sustained local campaign outpolled every Labour candidate standing — a pattern repeated across wards throughout the borough. The block voting system had no mechanism to reward breadth of engagement or effort: it simply rewarded the most organised and unified voting bloc.

It is worth distinguishing block voting in multi-member wards from single-member first-past-the-post. The coordination premium is structurally higher: a cohesive 32 per cent bloc can sweep three seats simultaneously in a way that would not occur in a series of individual contests. The question this blog is asking is not primarily about proportionality per se, but whether the electoral system can transmit accountability signals when a council is under active statutory intervention for documented governance failure.

This points to a question the electoral systems literature and the local democracy literature have rarely addressed together: when opposition parties are structurally disadvantaged by electoral mechanics, what additional tools does a democratic accountability framework need?

The accountability paradox

A long line of research — from Fiorina’s retrospective voting model through Powell and Whitten’s clarity-of-responsibility framework — establishes that electoral punishment for governance failure is neither automatic nor uniform. Recent scholarship sharpens this further: voters weigh integrity against perceived competence and community delivery (Breitenstein and Hernández, 2024); punishment weakens when opposition is fragmented and alternation unclear (Otjes and Stiers, 2022); and elections are in any case a blunt accountability instrument compared to courts, oversight bodies, and civic challenge (Papadopoulos, 2023). The established literature identifies three conditions that must be met for punishment to occur: voters must have clear information about failure; they must be able to attribute responsibility to the correct actor; and accountability must not be crowded out by competing loyalties or trade-offs. Tower Hamlets 2026 illustrates the failure of all three conditions simultaneously.

Yet the Tower Hamlets case also points to a fourth condition, largely absent from the existing retrospective voting literature: the accountability mechanism itself must be seen as legitimate by the communities it is meant to protect. This is the accountability paradox at the heart of the 2026 result — and it is a contribution that the standard retrospective voting framework is not equipped to capture.

For intervention to function as a democratic corrective, it must be perceived by the electorate — and particularly by the communities most affected by governance failure — as rational, impartial, and operating in their interests. Where that perception fails, intervention becomes politically legible as external imposition, and voting for the incumbent becomes an act of community solidarity rather than an endorsement of governance failure. This dynamic is not accidental: it is actively constructed through political framing, and incumbents with strong identity-based bonds with their electorate are structurally well-placed to construct it.

Recent research on statutory intervention in English local government proposes a five-stage model — crisis revelation, delegitimisation, imposed reforms, capacity building, and restoration — and argues that interventions must be carefully designed to appear rational rather than political if they are to maintain rather than undermine faith in local democracy (Lowther, Joyce and Whiteman, 2025). That model’s second stage — delegitimisation — describes central government’s work to undermine the legitimacy of the council being intervened in. What the Tower Hamlets 2026 election reveals is that delegitimisation can also operate in the opposite direction: the incumbent successfully turned the intervention itself into the object of delegitimisation in the eyes of the electorate, making the accountability mechanism the thing that lacked legitimacy rather than the council it was designed to hold to account.

Conversations on the doorstep revealed the depth of this reframing. Many Aspire supporters had not engaged with the contents of the Best Value report because they had already concluded the report itself was politically motivated — a tool of mainstream parties who disapproved of what Aspire represented rather than a genuine accountability mechanism. More striking still, when specific governance failures were raised — including nepotism and unqualified appointments — some voters had internalised a counter-narrative in which such practices represented community protection rather than misconduct.

It would be reductive to dismiss these perceptions as simply the product of misinformation. Communities with long experience of political marginalisation may have genuine historical grounds for scepticism toward central government intervention, and those experiences shape how accountability claims are received. What the Tower Hamlets case illustrates is the extent to which this pre-existing disposition was mobilised and amplified through deliberate political communication — producing not political apathy but the successful reconstruction of what accountability itself means.

This is not unique to Tower Hamlets. It is a dynamic that researchers of democratic resilience and local governance are increasingly attentive to, and it raises important questions about how accountability mechanisms are designed, communicated, and embedded — questions that are as much about institutional culture and civic trust as they are about statutory frameworks.

Tower Hamlets in context

Tower Hamlets did not stand alone in 2026. The elections produced historic Green gains across inner London — in Hackney, Waltham Forest, Lewisham and Southwark — and a significant realignment of the progressive vote away from Labour. What makes Tower Hamlets distinctive is that this regional realignment intersected with the specific dynamics of the Aspire incumbency, the governance intervention, and the structural incentives of block voting, producing an outcome more disproportionate than anywhere else in the capital.

Understanding whether Tower Hamlets represents an outlier or an advance indicator requires systematic comparison. Several English councils have been subject to statutory intervention in recent years — including Birmingham, Croydon, Slough, Sandwell, and Thurrock — yet the relationship between intervention, governance accountability, and subsequent electoral outcomes has received little comparative attention. Whether the accountability paradox identified here is specific to Tower Hamlets or reflects a broader pattern in how statutory intervention interacts with local political culture is a question that future comparative research must address.

The stakes

What the Tower Hamlets elections confirm, above all, is that democratic resilience is not reducible to electoral outcomes. The borough’s communities — residents navigating overcrowded housing, fractured services, and the cumulative pressures of one of England’s most deprived urban environments — continue to engage, organise, and hold their representatives to account through multiple channels. That engagement, not any single election result, is the foundation on which accountable local governance must ultimately be rebuilt.

What forms of accountability can work when statutory intervention loses legitimacy in the eyes of the very communities it is meant to protect?

Dr Gulay Icoz is a Visiting Research Fellow at Middlesex University London and stood as the Labour candidate for Bethnal Green West in the May 2026 local elections and Former Councillor in Hackney (2006–2014). She researches democratic resilience, local governance, and progressive voter realignment in inner London.

References

Academic sources

Breitenstein, S. and Hernández, E. (2024) ‘Too Crooked to be Good? Trade-offs in the Electoral Punishment of Malfeasance and Corruption’, European Political Science Review. doi:10.1017/S175577392400016X

Fiorina, M.P. (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lowther, J., Joyce, P. and Whiteman, P. (2025) ‘Intervention 3.0: Designing a Responsive Model for Local Government Support in England’, INLOGOV Blog, 4 November 2025. Available at: https://inlogov.com/2025/11/04/intervention-3-0-designing-a-responsive-model-for-local-government-support-in-england/ [Also published as ‘How not to damage democracy’, Municipal Journal, 16 October 2025.]

Otjes, S. and Stiers, D. (2022) ‘Accountability and alternation: How wholesale and partial alternation condition retrospective voting’, Party Politics, 28(3), pp. 457–467.

Papadopoulos, Y. (2023) Understanding Accountability in Democratic Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Elements in Public Policy).

Powell, G.B. and Whitten, G.D. (1993) ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), pp. 391–414.

Government documents

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2024) Best Value Inspection Report: London Borough of Tower Hamlets. London: MHCLG. November 2024.

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2026) Written Ministerial Statement: Tower Hamlets Best Value Intervention. London: MHCLG. January 2026.

Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (2026) Enhanced Intervention Powers: Tower Hamlets. Ministerial Announcement. March 2026.

From top-down diagnosis to co-design: what youth‑led evidence adds to the Government’s review of Young people and Work

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Sonia Bussu

The government’s Young People and Work interim report presents a stark diagnosis. Nearly one million young people in the UK are not in education, employment or training (NEET), and the problem is structural, longstanding and getting worse. The report describes a system failure spanning education, labour markets, health and welfare, and it concludes that the UK lacks a coherent “participation system” to support transitions into work. It is a powerful diagnosis of a system that no longer supports young people. But it is also striking that much of what the report “discovers” has already been articulated vividly by young people themselves, many times over!

The INSPIRE programme in the West Midlands offers exactly this missing perspective: lived experience. Through participatory research and legislative theatre, a diverse group of young people aged 14–17 from across the region identified specific barriers, staged a play to reflect on these barriers with the community and policymakers, and co‑designed policy proposals to address them. Set alongside the government’s diagnosis, this youth‑led evidence helps move from description of problems to concrete and youth-led solutions.

Structural barriers are visible in lived experience

The government review highlights three major structural issues: reduced entry‑level jobs, fragmented systems and unequal access to support. The INSPIRE young co-creators showed us how they encounter these issues day to day. Their play, You’re Fried! The realities of youth employment, depicts a system where career guidance is rushed and superficial, where broken weblinks and empty words replace meaningful support, where opportunities are inaccessible, in a cycle of “entry‑level” roles that always require prior experience.

You’re Fried! The Realities of Youth Employment
Scene One: “What Should I Do With My Life?” revealed how love, when bound by fear, could become a cage. A young apprentice’s dream was crushed beneath the weight of parental expectations, where university was seen as the only safe route to independence.
Scene Two: “It’s All on You” exposed the hollow machinery of career guidance – rushed advisors offering broken links and empty words, leaving hope behind in the rush to tick boxes.
Scene Three: “Link Not Found” brought a computer to life, its customer-service smile masking the cold indifference of digital systems that fail those who need them most.
Scene Four: “This Isn’t What I Signed Up For” pulled back the curtain on the myth of ‘real-world experience’ – a McDonald’s shift where understaffing and blame replaced training and support.
Scene Five: “It’s Your Fault” returned to the family living room, where systemic failure was rewritten as personal shame, completing a devastating circle.

The government review links NEET risk to socioeconomic background, race, disability and geography. The INSPIRE young people described the same dynamics of discrimination and constrained expectations. Systemic failures are often reframed as individual shortcomings, reflecting a system that assesses young people but does not adequately support them, placing the burden of navigating complexity on individuals.

While employers face uncertainty and capacity constraints, young people also reported the limited support on accessing valuable work placements or apprenticeships, as they suffer from limited training, little supervision and weak protections. In these situations, responsibility again falls on the young person to adapt. The issue is not a lack of motivation from young people, but a lack of fit between systems and the realities young people face. Young people want to work but are navigating fragmented and often inaccessible pathways.

Youth‑led proposals provide concrete solutions

One of the most innovative aspects of the INSPIRE project is its methodology. Legislative theatre allowed young people not just to describe problems, but to stage them, rehearse alternatives, and co-create policy responses. We co‑designed  proposals to improve access to work experience and employment through creative and structured dialogues between young people, policymakers, employers and communities.

Several of these proposals directly address the issues identified in the government review.

1. Earlier and family‑centred career support
The review highlights the importance of early intervention, noting that disadvantage accumulates over time. The INSPIRE young people proposed starting career conversations at primary school level and involving families, recognising that aspirations and knowledge about career pathways are shaped early and collectively.

2. Accessible and community‑based careers guidance
To address fragmentation and inequality in provision, participants proposed delivering career support also through community organisations and the voluntary sector.

3. Reform of work experience and employer engagement
In response to declining entry points into the labour market, young people proposed structured work experience, mentoring and exposure to workplaces through site visits and flexible placement formats. They also highlighted the need to prepare employers to support young people effectively. Working with local schools, we are now co-creating standards for youth‑friendly employers.

4. Cross‑sector coordination
The government review identifies fragmentation across institutions as a core problem.
INSPIRE proposals include the creation of a cross‑sector alliance on youth employment in Birmingham bringing together young people, education, employers, public bodies and community organisations to coordinate action.

5. Youth‑led evaluation and accountability
Young people know best what they need. They proposed mechanisms for evaluating careers services and employer practices, embedding youth perspectives into ongoing policy development. A youth-led evaluation of career and employment support is now being implemented, co-led by Birmingham City Council and the University of Birmingham.

Rethinking policy: from programmes to relationships

A recurring criticism in participation is the lack of follow-through from policymakers. Young participants expressed frustration with commitments that are vague or delayed, or carelessly forgotten, which deeply undermines their trust in institutions.

INSPIRE suggests that the answer is not simply better engagement programmes, but different relationships between institutions and young people, where trust depends on feedback loops, transparent commitments, and long-term engagement rather than one-off consultations. It’s not simply about redesigning systems but redistributing power.

Young people do not need to be fixed or made “work-ready”. They need systems that recognise their knowledge, respond to their realities, and involve them as partners in shaping policy that affects them.

Sonia researches and teaches public policy. Her main research interests are participatory governance and democratic innovations, and creative and arts-based methods for research and public engagement.

Labour must listen, learn and change if it is to regain trust

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Ketan Sheth

After two decades as a Labour councillor in Brent, I was deeply disappointed to lose my Wembley seat in the local elections on 7th May —  serving our local residents has been a great honour and privilege, and I remain grateful to everyone who placed their trust in me over the years.

I do feel, though, that Labour needs to learn urgent lessons from these disastrous results. Again and again on the doorstep, people told me that they valued my work as a councillor and would happily vote for me again — but they simply could not bring themselves to put a cross next to a Labour candidate. There is a deep well of anger in Brent, and across the whole country — a feeling that the Labour government has let people down and failed to deliver the change they promised in 2024.

Make no mistake, voters reflected the national political picture rather than what is going on in Brent. People relate local grievances like the state of our roads, pavements and parks to a wider sense of hopelessness based on their view of where we are nationally, rather than voting specifically on local matters. Indeed, many people said they voted on issues like immigration or the economy which local government has no power to fix.

This is arguably always the case in local elections and I’m hardly the first local councillor to lose their seat due to people’s views on how well the national government is or is not doing. But this time felt different. The vitriol directed towards the government, and the Prime Minister, was stronger than anything I have encountered while canvassing in the past. Unless Labour changes direction quickly and radically, it is hard to see how future elections will yield a different result. Labour has made big mistakes in government — our first notable action was the winter fuel payments fiasco and we seemed to go on making mis-steps from there. The appointment of Peter Mandelson as US ambassador was a catastrophic error of judgement. The cost of living crisis remains largely unaddressed — voters do not see their lives or their crumbling public services getting any better. All of these things are exacerbated by our government offering no hope that things are about to improve. We need to listen to what the voters are telling us — and we need a sharp, fast change of direction.

Locally, addressing our collective challenges under a hung council will be difficult, as it is always easier for a Council to have a clear electoral mandate and we now have a position where there will need to be negotiation and trade-offs between the different parties. But I am sure all those involved will take their responsibilities seriously and work together to deliver for the people of Brent.

For my own part, I will hugely miss representing local people as part of Brent Council. I want to thank those who voted for me, the officers and colleagues who supported me over many years. I will continue to be active in local politics and to campaign for a better deal for the communities I was proud to serve.

Now is the time to refresh local politics

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Photo by Michael D Beckwith on Pexels.com

Phil Swann

The sad state of many neighbourhoods and communities, with their desolated high streets, has been identified as a significant driver of the rejection of politicians and political parties which lay behind the May 2026 local election results

As the shallowness of programmes such as Pride in Place demonstrates, this is not an issue that central government can tackle alone. It requires local action reflecting local circumstances. Yet local councils lack the resources and levers to secure lasting improvements. Meeting this challenge requires deep collaboration between central and local government at a time when changes in political control locally will make that more difficult to achieve than ever.

Is it too naïve to hope that engagement between local political actors, local people and local organisations and groups could inform new approaches to revitalise struggling local communities? Could the involvement of national politicians in the process secure the reform of local government finance and the provision of new powers necessary to enable localities to act?

Writing in 1939, when he was leader of the Labour Group on Oxford City Council, Richard Crossman, argued that one of the strongest arguments for local party politics “is that they do provide a method of creating interest and focussing attention upon the enormously important issues as stake.” Crossman, who went to serve as Harold Wilson’s Minister for Housing and Local Government, added that “the real basis of successful political democracy is not to be found in politics at all, but below the surface in the organisation of a whole network of popular interests into pressure groups.”

Writing just over 40 years later, when he was leader of Sheffield Council, David Blunkett also called for collective local action. He argued that politicians and communities should “do things together rather than having them done for us, to remove the conditions of poverty and dependence rather than trap people in them, and thus to develop a sense of supporting and being supported.” He made a similar point in 2004, when he was Home Secretary, recognising the importance of a partnership between local politicians and citizens “to revitalise democracy and strengthen citizenship and civil society, so that people are part of the process of reform and modernisation.”

Now more than ever it is important to follow the advice of Crossman and Blunkett and refresh local politics through collaboration with local groups and communities to deliver improvements locally and secure reforms nationally to enable that local action. Succeeding in doing this could also begin to restore trust in politics and politicians.

Phil Swann is studying for a PhD at INLOGOV in the Department of Public Administration and Policy, University of Birmingham, on the contribution of politicians to central-local government relations.

What works in local growth and skills? Learning from recent evaluations

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Jason Lowther

Following the previous blog on homelessness and rough sleeping, this piece turns to another major area of local government activity: local growth and skills programmes. Here too, evaluation activity has expanded rapidly, with a mix of national frameworks, programme‑level syntheses and place‑based studies. Taken together, these evaluations offer a valuable, and still evolving, picture of what is working, what is proving harder, and what local systems actually need to deliver economic outcomes.

Four strands of evidence stand out.

MHCLG local growth evaluation

The MHCLG local growth evaluation programme is significant not just for its findings, but for its approach to evaluation itself. Rather than focusing on single programmes, it introduces a portfolio‑level strategy covering multiple funds aimed at improving sub‑national economic performance.

Recent work, including the process evaluation of the Local Growth Fund and Getting Building Fund, highlight both strengths and tensions in the model. Decentralised decision‑making and the “single pot” approach enabled locally tailored investment and stronger alignment with local strategies. Private sector involvement and local prioritisation were widely valued.  However, delivery was shaped by pressures to deliver “shovel‑ready” projects quickly, particularly in the Getting Building Fund, which sometimes limited strategic coherence and innovation. Governance arrangements, while locally responsive, were often complex, and approaches to monitoring and evaluation were variable. More broadly, the evaluation underlines the difficulty of measuring long‑term economic impact, particularly where interventions are diverse and outcomes unfold over many years.

Multiply deep dives (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland)

The Multiply deep dives bring a skills and employability perspective, focusing on adult numeracy provision across the devolved nations. Multiply was a £559 million UK‑wide programme designed to improve functional numeracy, with flexible, locally designed delivery models.

The deep dives use qualitative case studies, interviews with delivery partners and analysis of monitoring data, focusing on one area in each nation and drawing on wider place‑level evidence. A central finding is that local flexibility enabled innovation, particularly in embedding numeracy in real‑world contexts such as employment, parenting or financial capability.

At the same time, the evaluations highlight familiar delivery challenges. Short delivery timescales, in some cases just a year, created pressure to scale quickly, often leading to adaptation of existing provision rather than genuinely new approaches. Partnership working across councils, colleges and the voluntary sector was essential but time‑consuming to establish. Engagement with target groups remained difficult, particularly where low confidence rather than low skill was the primary barrier.

Overall, the evidence suggests that contextualised, learner‑centred approaches are promising, but require time, trust and sustained funding to embed.

UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) interim evaluation synthesis

The UKSPF interim synthesis report provides perhaps the most comprehensive current view, drawing together 34 place‑based evaluations across the UK. It focuses on process learning rather than impact, reflecting the relatively early stage of delivery.

A clear headline is the importance of local autonomy. Across almost all areas, the ability for Lead Local Authorities to design interventions around local needs was strongly valued, particularly compared to the perceived rigidity of previous EU funds. This flexibility supported alignment with local strategies, more responsive delivery, and better integration across policy areas.

Other success factors included strong local programme management teams, continuity of provision (using UKSPF to sustain previously funded services), and the ability to combine funding streams to create coherent local offers. However, challenges were equally consistent. Tight central government timelines constrained planning and procurement, limited consultation, and created recruitment difficulties. As with other programmes, evaluation and outcome measurement remained underdeveloped.

The synthesis highlights a key tension: local freedom within central constraints. While devolution of decision‑making was real, the operating environment still imposed significant limits on what places could achieve.

UKSPF place‑based evaluations

The place‑based evaluations add depth to this picture by examining how UKSPF worked in specific localities. Using mixed‑methods approaches – including contribution analysis, surveys, interviews and case studies – across 34 areas, they explore how combinations of interventions interact within local systems.

These studies show that outcomes are highly context‑dependent. In some areas, UKSPF supported visible improvements in community facilities, local business support, and employability outcomes. In others, impacts were harder to detect, reflecting both the early stage of delivery and the complexity of local economies. What emerges clearly is that programme success depends less on individual projects than on how they are aligned and sequenced locally.

The evaluations also reinforce the importance of existing capacity and partnerships. Areas with mature governance arrangements, strong voluntary sector links, and prior experience of managing regeneration funding were better able to mobilise quickly and deliver coherent programmes.

What does this mean for local authorities?

Across these evaluations, several consistent lessons emerge.

First, local flexibility works, particularly when supported by capacity and stability. Both UKSPF and Multiply demonstrate the value of devolved decision‑making. However, the benefits are uneven, depending on local capability, existing partnerships, and the time available to plan and deliver.

Second, time is the missing ingredient in local growth policy. Tight delivery timescales appear across all programmes, driving a focus on “shovel‑ready” activity, limiting innovation, and constraining partnership development. Economic change, skills development and behaviour change all take longer than funding cycles typically allow.

Third, integration matters more than individual interventions. The strongest evidence, particularly from the place‑based evaluations, is that impact depends on how interventions fit together. Skills, business support and community investment are interdependent, yet funding streams and evaluation frameworks often treat them separately.

Fourth, measurement remains a weak spot. Across the local growth portfolio, there are persistent challenges in demonstrating impact and value for money. This is partly methodological, but also reflects the reality that many outcomes (productivity, employment, resilience) are long‑term and influenced by wider factors.

Finally, these evaluations underline a familiar but important point: local systems deliver national priorities. Where programmes align with local strategies, build on existing partnerships and allow room for adaptation, they show promise. Where they are constrained by short timescales, fragmented funding or complex governance, delivery becomes more transactional.

The conclusions from the local growth and skills evaluations strongly align with, and are reinforced by last month’s excellent report from the Institute for Government, Designing and delivering employment support.  The IfG goes further in diagnosing why these issues persist and what structural reform is needed. Both emphasise the value of local flexibility, integration and tailoring to place, with the IfG explicitly arguing that strategic authorities are best placed to design joined‑up employment support aligned to local labour markets and services. Likewise, both bodies of evidence highlight fragmentation and poor coordination across programmes as major barriers, with the IfG noting longstanding failures to “shift the dial” despite multiple national schemes, echoing local growth evaluations on disjointed funding and siloed interventions. The IfG report places significant emphasis on the limits of centralised systems and the need for multi‑year funding, capability and accountability frameworks.

In short, the local growth evaluations provide grounded evidence of what works in practice, while the IfG report offers a more explicit systems diagnosis: that without sustained devolution, integration and long‑term investment, the conditions needed for those “what works” approaches to succeed will remain constrained.

What works in homelessness and rough sleeping

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Jason Lowther

We’ve just started a new series of Inlogov blogs summarising the growing body of evaluation evidence in local government, and what it tells us about how councils are learning what works. Nowhere is that learning more urgent or more complex than in homelessness and rough sleeping. A series of recent national evaluations provide a rich, if sometimes uncomfortable, picture of how programmes are operating on the ground, what difference they are making, and where the system continues to struggle. 

Systems‑wide evaluation of homelessness and rough sleeping

The systems‑wide evaluation represents a deliberate attempt to step back from individual programmes and understand homelessness as a complex, interconnected system rather than a set of discrete services. Led by the Centre for Homelessness Impact with research partners, the early reports combine systems‑mapping, policy analysis and qualitative fieldwork in five local authority areas.

The core finding is stark: the system is not working as intended. Public spending and organisational effort are disproportionately focused on crisis response rather than prevention, even though this approach places increasing pressure on local authorities and delivers poorer outcomes. Fragmented funding streams, short‑term grants and inconsistent incentives across departments actively undermine joined‑up working. The evaluation does find examples of strong local partnership practice,but these are often working around the system rather than being supported by it.

The central conclusion is that meaningful progress requires sustained, cross‑government commitment to prevention, better alignment between housing, health, justice and welfare systems, and a clearer understanding of how national policy choices shape local outcomes.

Rough sleeping and complex needs process evaluation

The rough sleeping and complex needs evaluation zooms in on services supporting people facing the most entrenched disadvantage. This process evaluation examined interventions funded through the Rough Sleeping Grant and Rough Sleeping Social Impact Bonds, focusing on people with co‑occurring mental health and substance misuse needs.

Using case studies across 12 areas, interviews with service users and staff, and cost analysis, the evaluation explored how different models worked in practice. It found that progress, including improved housing stability and engagement with services, was most likely where support was flexible, persistent and relationship‑based. Small caseloads, psychologically informed approaches and multi‑disciplinary working were all important.

However, delivery was often hampered by structural barriers beyond local control: gaps in mental health provision, restrictive criteria in mainstream services, workforce instability and the limitations of short‑term funding.

Rough Sleeping Initiative process evaluation

The Rough Sleeping Initiative (RSI) process evaluation complements earlier impact analysis by explaining how and why the initiative achieved results. While the impact evaluation estimated a significant reduction in rough sleeping in RSI areas, the process evaluation explored local delivery through surveys of all funded authorities and in‑depth qualitative case studies.

Local authorities consistently reported that RSI funding enabled them to expand outreach, create specialist roles, and strengthen partnerships with health and voluntary sector providers. Rapid mobilisation, local flexibility and visible political commitment were key strengths. Many areas highlighted the value of multi‑disciplinary teams and assertive outreach in engaging people who had been sleeping rough for long periods.

At the same time, the evaluation identified familiar challenges: recruitment difficulties, reliance on short funding cycles, and the risk of losing skilled staff when funding ends.

Next Steps Accommodation Programme evaluation (briefing paper)

The Next Steps Accommodation Programme (NSAP) evaluation focuses on what happened after the incredible emergency response of “Everyone In” during the Covid pandemic lockdowns. It draws on two waves of interviews with service users in 34 local authorities, around 12 and 18 months after they were placed in longer‑term accommodation.

The findings are cautiously positive. Many people reported improved stability, safety and wellbeing, and a reduced use of emergency services. Sustained accommodation outcomes were more likely where individuals received ongoing, tailored support alongside housing. However, the evaluation is clear about its limits: the absence of baseline data, attrition over time, and the likelihood that those still in contact with services are the “success cases”.

Crucially, it highlights risks to sustainability, particularly affordability pressures, isolation, and unmet support needs.

Capital Letters process evaluation

The Capital Letters process evaluation adds an important organisational and commercial dimension to the evidence base. Capital Letters was established in 2019 as a borough‑owned, non‑profit company to reduce homelessness and temporary accommodation use in London by collectively procuring private rented sector homes, reducing competition between boroughs and driving better value for money.

The evaluation, based on interviews with boroughs, board members, landlords and MHCLG officials, alongside document and performance data review, focuses on how the initiative was set up, governed and sustained. It finds that Capital Letters had early success in demonstrating the potential of scale, shared negotiation and coordinated landlord engagement. Boroughs valued the ambition to change market dynamics rather than simply manage them.

However, the evaluation also highlights significant challenges. Achieving financial self‑sufficiency while meeting social objectives proved extremely difficult, particularly in a highly pressured London housing market. Tensions emerged between commercial risk, borough expectations and the constraints of homelessness legislation. Governance and accountability arrangements were complex, and uneven borough engagement limited the company’s ability to operate at the scale originally envisaged. Ultimately, despite grant support, Capital Letters was unable to become financially sustainable and subsequently wound down operations in 2025.

What does this mean for local authorities?

Read together, these evaluations paint a coherent but challenging picture of what local government can do in homelessness and rough sleeping.

First, prevention and system change demand stability. The biggest barriers to progress lie beyond individual projects. Short funding cycles, fragmented policy levers and misaligned national incentives consistently undermine local efforts, even where practice is strong. Councils can innovate, but without longer‑term certainty the system pulls them back towards crisis response.

Second, relationships and capability are critical. Outreach teams, assertive support for people with complex needs, and sustained tenancy support all rely on skilled staff, trust and persistence. These are precisely the elements most at risk from time‑limited programmes and competitive commissioning.

Third, housing supply and affordability are constraints. The Rough Sleeping Initiative and Next Steps evaluations both underline that service innovation only works when there are viable move‑on options. Capital Letters reinforces this at a system level: even ambitious collective approaches struggle when the underlying market is stacked against local authorities.

Fourth, collaboration is necessary but tricky. Whether through multi‑disciplinary teams or borough‑owned companies, partnership working requires time, governance capacity and shared risk. The evidence suggests collaboration works best when it is supported by clear national frameworks, realistic financial models and space to mature, rather than when it is required to develop and achieve results rapidly.

Finally, these evaluations show the growing value of learning‑focused evaluation in local government. They do not offer simple answers or “magic bullet” models. Instead, they help councils articulate what they are already experiencing on the ground and provide credible evidence to challenge policies and funding arrangements that make homelessness harder, not easier, to resolve.

The learning is no longer about whether local authorities know what works. It is about whether the wider system will allow them to do it.