How constrained is UK local government? International evidence on spending, taxation and autonomy

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Paul Joyce, Jason Lowther, Philip Whiteman

What place does local government occupy within the UK system of public governance? International evidence suggests that UK local government combines three characteristics: comparatively low expenditure, small locally attributed tax revenue and medium-low institutional autonomy.

We now explore the evidence, draw conclusions, and clarify some of the assumptions and limitations of our conclusions.

Recently published OECD data indicate that United Kingdom local authorities account for expenditure equivalent to 9.3 per cent of GDP in 2023. This was below the EU27 average of 11.1 per cent of local government expenditure. Locally attributed tax revenue for the UK amounted to 1.7 per cent of GDP compared with an  EU27 average of 3.7 per cent. 

In this blog, “local government” refers to the OECD’s S.1313 local-government subsector. Depending on national institutional arrangements, this may include regional and other intermediate authorities as well as municipalities. See the note at the end of the blog for more on the OECD reporting of data.

The UK differs considerably in its expenditure and fiscal arrangements from some northern European countries, particularly Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway, which have long been rated as having high scores on the published estimates of “Government Effectiveness” (see the World Bank published Worldwide Governance Indicators database). For the countries included in our analysis, local government tax revenue and expenditure are each moderately and positively associated with national government effectiveness (r=0.43 and r=0.44, respectively).

Three points should be kept in mind. First, these correlations establish association, not causation.

Second, “Government Effectiveness” is a national governance indicator that is based on perceptions of public services, the civil service, policy formulation and implementation, and government credibility. It is not a direct measure of local-government effectiveness. Its use in this analysis is on the grounds that local government is part of a multi-level governance system, interacts administratively and financially with central government, and may affect the effectiveness of the national governance system.

Third, the tax revenue data reported by the OECD do not measure only taxes over which subnational and local authorities have unilateral control and therefore are not appropriate for measuring tax autonomy. According to the OECD (2025), the reported tax revenue figure is partly own-source taxes and partly taxes shared with central government.  We cannot immediately infer from these data how much discretion subnational and local governments possess over rates, tax bases, reliefs or use of revenue.

The results suggest that a relatively large and fiscally significant local-government sector is compatible with effective government, but they do not demonstrate that a large local fiscal role causes government effectiveness. Two findings stand out:

1. Countries with comparatively high local government expenditure or tax revenue generally have medium-high or high Government Effectiveness scores (see the World Bank’s databank).

2. Countries with low local government expenditure or tax revenue display a much wider range of government effectiveness scores. Türkiye, Mexico, and Colombia are at the lower end and Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland are at the upper end.

The relationship involving tax revenue data is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1. Scatterplot of government effectiveness and local government tax revenue, 2023

Note on tax data in Figure 1: For unitary countries we use the OECD’s main subnational figure, which corresponds to the S.1313 local-government subsector. For federal and quasi-federal countries, we use the separate “Local government alone” figures.

Using OECD data for 2023, we found a strong positive correlation (r=0.79) between local government expenditure and local government tax revenue. We hypothesise that countries with larger local government sectors provide the required finance partly through transfers of money from central government and partly through local taxes, fees and charges.  Figure 2 illustrates the existence of a strong correlation between local government expenditure and tax revenue.

Figure 2. Scatterplot of local government expenditure and local government tax revenue, 2023

Note on tax and expenditure data in Figure 2: For unitary countries we use the OECD’s main subnational figure, which corresponds to the S.1313 local-government subsector. For federal and quasi-federal countries, we use the separate “Local government alone” figures.

Figure 2 also reveals the presence of a small group of countries in which locally attributed tax revenue is lower than would be expected based on the scale of their expenditure. This is evident visually: the countries lie noticeably below the general expenditure-taxation relationship implicit in the figure. As can be seen, this group includes Austria, Czechia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom.

Table 1 presents two measures of the relationship between tax revenue and expenditure for these countries: the tax coverage ratio and the local government tax-expenditure gap. The tax coverage ratio is calculated here by dividing tax revenue by expenditure and multiplying by 100. The tax-expenditure gap is calculated by subtracting tax revenue from expenditure, with both expressed as percentages of GDP. It represents the scale of local government expenditure not matched by locally attributed tax revenue. It is not a measure of a budget deficit and should not be understood as consisting entirely of central government transfers.

Table 1 Local government expenditure and tax revenue in selected countries, 2023

CountryLocal-government expenditure (% GDP)Local-government tax revenue (% GDP)Tax coverage ratio (%)Local-government tax–expenditure gap (% of GDP)
Estonia10.50.21.910.3
Czechia12.20.43.311.8
Lithuania9.20.33.38.9
Slovenia8.90.55.68.4
Slovak Republic8.50.55.98.0
Netherlands12.71.29.411.5
Austria9.21.314.17.9
United Kingdom9.31.718.37.6

Source: calculated from OECD (2025) data. For Austria, the “local government alone” figure is used.

The fiscal picture shown in Table 1 raises a broad institutional question: does it reflect a conception of local government as a distinct sphere of democratic governance, or primarily as an administrative means of delivering responsibilities determined nationally? The existence of low tax coverage (e.g., less than 20%) and a relatively large tax-expenditure gap (e.g., over 7 % of GDP) do not imply a fiscal imbalance because local government receives funding through a variety of mechanisms. Nevertheless, low tax coverage and a large gap is consistent with a system in which local authorities have significant service responsibilities but comparatively small locally attributed tax revenue.

We stress that expenditure and tax data do not by themselves establish the extent of local government autonomy.  For autonomy has constitutional, political, and administrative dimensions as well as fiscal dimensions.

Therefore, we need to examine autonomy more comprehensively. We turn to the Local Autonomy Index (LAI 2.0) (see Ladner, Keuffer and Bastianen, 2025). According to this index, UK local government belonged to the medium-low autonomy group during the period 2015 to 2020. Its LAI score was below both the EU and OECD mean scores. It was not the lowest on local autonomy: some countries, including Ireland, Russia and Belarus, recorded lower levels of local autonomy than the United Kingdom.

The UK received a comparatively low score on the LAI’s “non-interference” dimension. This suggests that UK local government is subject to significant forms of financial and administrative supervision.

In summary, we conclude that the expenditure, revenue and autonomy evidence suggests that UK local government occupies a comparatively constrained position within the wider system of public governance. Local authorities perform important public functions, but the locally attributed tax revenue is small, and their institutional autonomy is only medium-low by international standards. In England, statutory intervention in authorities judged by national government to be failing provides a particularly visible example of the vertical powers of supervision and control retained by central government.

These findings do not demonstrate that greater fiscal decentralisation would automatically improve public services or government effectiveness. They do, however, provide grounds for carefully designed and evaluated pilot reforms intended to strengthen local fiscal and strategic autonomy. Such experiments would need to assess not only their effects on local choice and accountability, but also their implications for service performance, fiscal sustainability and territorial equality.

Note

The OECD uses “subnational government” to encompass state, regional and local government. In unitary countries without a regional tier, this may consist primarily of local government, which is municipal councils and higher levels of local government. In the case of the OECD data on the UK, the devolved administrations of Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales are included in central government. Most of the countries in the OECD data are unitary countries, and so mostly we are talking about local government when looking at subnational data. The federal and quasi-federal countries included in this analysis are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Germany, Mexico, Spain, and Switzerland, for which local government data alone is also reported.

References

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2025) Subnational governments: Structure and finance. 2025 edition. Paris: OECD. Available at: https://www.oecd.org/content/dam/oecd/en/topics/policy-issues/subnational-finance-and-investment/subnational-governments-infrastructure-finance-2025.pdf (Accessed: 21 July 2026).

Ladner, A., Keuffer, N. and Bastianen, A. (2025) ‘Local autonomy around the world: the updated and extended Local Autonomy Index (LAI 2.0)’, Regional & Federal Studies, 35(2), pp. 163–185. doi: 10.1080/13597566.2023.2267990.

World Bank (2026) Worldwide Governance Indicators. Available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/publication/worldwide-governance-indicators (Accessed: 29 July 2026).

Do female mayors make local government more transparent? Only when politics lets them

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Bruna Ribeiro (University of Minho), Miguel Rodrigues (University of Minho) and Francisca Tejedo-Romero (University of Castilla-La Mancha)

Why do some municipalities open their books, publish their contracts and document their decisions online, while their neighbours – operating under exactly the same legal framework – remain opaque? Freedom of information laws set a floor, but the striking fact about local government transparency is how much variation survives above that floor. If the law were the whole story, all councils would look alike. They do not.

In our recent article in Local Government Studies, we explore one part of the answer that has attracted growing attention across Europe: who leads. Specifically, we ask whether female leadership changes how much information municipalities actively disclose to their citizens — and whether the political context in which women govern conditions that effect.

Why leadership and gender?

The theoretical case is well established. Research across countries has associated women’s political presence with lower tolerance of corruption, different risk preferences, and a stronger orientation towards accountability. Earlier work on Spanish municipalities found that women’s representation in local councils has a positive influence on transparency levels. But representation on the council and leadership of the executive are different things. Mayors set administrative priorities, control the machinery that produces (or withholds) information, and answer personally for what appears on the municipal website. If gender matters for transparency, the mayor’s office is where we would expect it to show.

Portugal offers an unusually good laboratory. Since 2013, the Municipal Transparency Index (MTI), produced by Transparency International Portugal, has scored all 308 municipalities from 0 to 100 on the information they make available through their official websites. This gives us a consistent, externally produced measure of active disclosure, in a system where women remain a small minority of mayors but where the 2006 Parity Law — recently strengthened from a 33% to a 40% candidate quota — has been steadily reshaping who enters local politics.

What we did

We linked each municipal election to the transparency performance of the government it produced: the mayors and councils elected in 2009 and 2013 were matched to the Municipal Transparency Index scores of 2013 and 2017, across all 308 municipalities. This temporal structure ensures that who governs strictly precedes what gets disclosed. We then tested whether the gender of the mayor is associated with transparency — on its own, and in interaction with two features of the political context: whether the mayor governs with an absolute majority, and whether they belong to a left-wing party. The models control for women’s presence in the council, financial autonomy, unemployment, turnout and population, and the results hold when we exclude Lisbon and Porto and under alternative specifications.

What we found

The headline result is not the one either optimists or sceptics might expect. Female mayors, on their own, have no statistically significant effect on municipal transparency. But the average conceals a striking conditional pattern. Without an absolute majority, female mayors are associated with transparency scores roughly 7.5 points lower on the 0–100 index than their male counterparts. Give them an absolute majority, and the association flips: the interaction adds around 10 points, turning the net effect positive — female-led municipalities with strong political backing outperform male-led ones. There is also suggestive (though weaker) evidence that belonging to a left-wing party partially offsets the negative baseline.

In other words, the question “do women govern more transparently?” is badly posed. The better question is: under what conditions can they? Women in Portuguese town halls are still rare — only about 7% of municipalities had a female mayor in the period we study — and those governing without a majority face weak institutional support that appears to hinder the implementation of transparency measures. Political strength provides the stability, resources and authority to translate leadership values into open governance; without it, being a pioneer is mostly an uphill struggle.

Why this matters beyond Portugal

Three implications travel well beyond the Portuguese case.

First, transparency policy is usually designed as if compliance were a purely administrative matter — build the portal, mandate the disclosure, audit the result. Our findings suggest that who is in office, and the political incentives they face, shape how far councils go beyond the legal minimum. Transparency is a political choice dressed up as an administrative one.

Second, the debate on gender quotas and parity laws tends to focus on descriptive representation — how many women get elected. Our evidence suggests that numbers are not enough. The mere presence of women in leadership does not, by itself, deliver more open government; what matters is whether they hold real power to act. Quotas should therefore go beyond numerical representation and be accompanied by the conditions for women to exercise actual influence — party support, resources, and genuine political authority. Putting women in office without power risks setting them up to underperform against expectations the literature itself created.

Third, for practitioners and transparency campaigners, the lesson is about where to aim. If disclosure responds to political context, then rankings and indices like Portugal’s Municipal Transparency Index are not just measurement tools — they are interventions, changing the reputational payoff of openness for the leaders most sensitive to it.

The bigger research picture

This article is part of a wider research agenda at the Research Centre in Political Science (CICP, University of Minho) on gender and local politics in Southern Europe. Companion studies have examined how women break the political glass ceiling at local level (Governance, 2025) and how voters respond to female candidates in local elections (South European Society and Politics, 2026). Together, they trace the full pipeline — from candidacy, through election, to what changes once women actually govern.

The transparency question sits at the end of that pipeline, and it may be the most consequential part: representation matters not only for who sits in the town hall, but for whether citizens can see what happens inside it.

Bruna Ribeiro recently completed her PhD in Administrative Sciences at the University of Minho (CICP). Miguel Rodrigues is Associate Professor with Habilitation at the School of Economics, Management and Political Science, University of Minho. Francisca Tejedo-Romero is based at the Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Castilla-La Mancha.

The full article, “Transparency in local government: exploring the impact of female leadership and political context”, is available in Local Government Studies: https://doi.org/10.1080/03003930.2025.2612054

The Participatory Party

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Phil Swann

The urgency of Sonia Busso’s call for councils to develop participatory governance arrangements is evident in her recent INLOGOV policy paper[1], The Participatory Council. Bussu recognises that politicians can enable or block this development and argues that progress can be impeded if the council as an institution is not prepared for meaningful participation. I argue in this blog that an equally important precondition of action is that political parties are engaged in participatory processes, reflecting their roles in both councils and wider civic society.

The Participatory Party should sit alongside the Participatory Council.

Bussu sets out a convincing set of recommendations to advance inclusive participation including developing the role of boundary spanners, building on existing community assets and resources, and adopting an intersectional approach to engage marginalised voices.

She recognises the part that political parties played in two of the five case she refers to: the introduction of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil; and the radical widening of the participatory infrastructure and processes in Barcelona. A third case, the deployment of citizens’ assemblies in the London Borough of Camden, was initiated by the then council leader Georgia Gould[2] following her recognition of the councils’ failure to listen to the residents of tower blocks in the borough before the tragic Grenfell Fire.

Bussu distinguishes between “disjointed events vulnerable to the political cycle” and “coherent processes embedded in day-to-day policymaking”, an ambition which is reflected in Gould’s final leader’s annual report in which she claimed the council was “getting on with a radical shift in power that is seeing democratic renewal led from the bottom up”.

In my view, however.  more attention needs to be paid to how political parties can play bigger roles both in enriching civic society and in embedding participatory process in the way that Bussu seeks. This is particularly important at a time when populist parties are opting for simplistic solutions rather than engaging with the hard graft of participatory policymaking.

Gould, for example, in a lecture in 2022 called for a move beyond a transactional model of public services. Demanding the abandonment of traditional structures and hierarchies and a recognition of the power of communities and the ability of residents to change their lives, she warned that “services that don’t have a connection to communities or an understanding of their needs can be de-humanising, paternalistic and create a transactional model of public services that cannot make lives better in the longer term.”

In terms of the contribution of politicians and political parties to this, there are three key lessons from the experience of three of Gould’s predecessors: Herbert Morrison, leader of the London County Council and dynamo of Atlee’s post-war government; Richard Crossman, Minister for Housing and Local Government in Harold Wilson’s first cabinet; and David Blunkett, leader of Sheffield and holder of three cabinet posts in Tony Blair’s government.

First, the potential for exploiting the contribution of political parties as an important feature of the wider civic society. Morrison, for example, was clear that it was impossible to understand local government without understanding how political parties worked. It was “out of the clash of opinion and principle between the parties” that progress was made. For Crossman vibrant local government hinged on overcoming public apathy and that political parties had the potential to do that so long as party membership provided substantive opportunities to influence party policy. Writing when he was leader of the Labour Group on Oxford City Council in 1939 he said: democracy inside our parties is as valuable a part of our liberties as the right of voting at elections.”

Blunkett believed that the value of local politics was not confined to its legal powers, but to its ability to extend and develop democracy enabling the emergence of new social movements. During the period when he was leader of Sheffield, Blunkett argued that “if we can stimulate the community action that brings people into the [Labour] party and gets them to relate their community problems to a sense of political purpose, then we have begun to change society.”

Second, the value of engagement beyond the council and the party. Towards the end of his period as a leading local politician Blunkett warned that town halls could feel “impossibly remote and anonymous”. Reflecting on the state of local government in 2023, he said council leaders should do more than run their authority: they should see the council as a mechanism for fully engaging local people. Morrison, in his reflections on his period as leader of the LCC in the 1930s, came to a similar conclusion: “It was important that councillors and aldermen, once elected and appointed, should still move among the people they represented. They should be with and for the people, not above them.”

Finally, the key link between local government and wider civic society. Crossman was clear that “the real basis of successful political democracy is not to be found in politics at all, but below the surface in the organisation of a whole network of popular interests”. He argued that the future of the Labour party depended on not on the competence of its leaders and its electoral success, but also on the creation of “new organisations for the conquest of liberties yet unwon.” Blunkett was equally honest about the need for local politicians to avoid paternalism. Writing in 2002, when he was Home Secretary, Blunkett described how every since his first experience of canvassing in his council ward he had been “keen to inform and involve as many residents of Sheffield and its environs as possible in the aims and decision-making of the council.”

Bussu is right to stress that participatory governance requires sustained political commitment and is vulnerable to political change. The work of Gould and politicians such as Morrison, Crossman and Blunkett has created the foundations on which to build a participatory party. And Andy Burnham’s statements about how he intends to lead the Labour Party and listen to communities suggests that now is a good time to do so.

Phil Swann is studying for a PhD on the contribution of politicians to central-local government relations at the University of Birmingham.

[1] The Participatory Council
http://epapers.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4443/

[2] Now an MP and minister

New Inlogov Policy Papers

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Jason Lowther

I am delighted to let you know about four new policy papers published today by Inlogov. 

Challenger Parties in Power Locally

https://epapers.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4446

This report examines the experience of ‘challenger parties’, political parties without previous experience of government, on entering power in local government. It examines the experiences of challenger parties in English local government following electoral gains in May 2025, focusing on how Reform UK and the Green Party of England and Wales have adapted to executive roles. Evidence from multiple case studies shows that, rather than transforming local governance, these parties have generally worked within existing institutional frameworks, with some early disruption typically giving way to learning and stabilisation as members adjust to formal procedures and constraints.  The research was developed with colleagues in Inlogov’s monthly Local Government Network webinar. 

The Participatory Council

http://epapers.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4443/

Councils need to develop participatory governance arrangements to address the declined levels of public trust in government, by giving residents a meaningful voice in decision making, improving transparency, and ensuring policies better reflect community needs and priorities. This report examines how councils can support institutional culture change towards participatory policymaking, drawing lessons from UK and international experiences. Too often, great work by individual officers, members or specific projects is lost because the council as an institution is ill prepared for public participation. The report argues that participatory policymaking must be deeply embedded within governance structures to enable meaningful engagement, mobilise diverse communities, and support mutual learning and transformative change. Achieving this requires facilitative leadership and the cultivation of boundary-spanning roles that bridge divides between government, civil society, and local communities. Advancing inclusive participation also demands an intersectional approach that centres marginalised voices to address systemic inequalities. This paper was written by Dr Sonia Bussu.

Paying For Democracy

https://epapers.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4445

Councillor remuneration plays a critical role in shaping participation in local democracy and the effectiveness of council governance, yet the current system in England remains inconsistent and increasingly misaligned with modern expectations. The total annual cost is around £230 million. Allowances vary widely between councils, reflecting a structure that has not kept pace with inflation or the growing demands of the role. This misalignment contributes to persistent barriers to participation, particularly for working-age individuals, those without independent financial means, and carers, with evidence indicating that remuneration levels directly affect both the diversity of candidates and their retention in office. Addressing these challenges requires setting more accessible allowance levels to broaden participation, enhancing consistency and transparency, expanding and normalising support mechanisms, and improving the evidence base to support informed and equitable remuneration decisions. Thanks to Emeritus Professor Colin Copus and Mr Ray Tomkinson for co-authoring this paper.

Constitutionalising English Local Government?

http://epapers.bham.ac.uk//id/eprint/4444

Government discourse increasingly accentuates devolution and local autonomy, using constitutional language. This paper aims to take the debate forward by examining the prospects for constitutional entrenchment of English local government within the existing uncodified constitutional framework. Encompassing both strategic and principal authorities within the term “local government”, it assesses what entrenchment could mean in the absence of a codified constitution, what obstacles stand in its way, and how constitutional weight could accumulate over time. The paper was written by Inlogov associate Prof Jonathan Davies. 

When accountability fails to bite: governance, democracy and the 2026 Tower Hamlets elections

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Dr Gulay Icoz, Visiting Research Fellow, Middlesex University London

In theory, the 2026 Tower Hamlets local elections should have been a test of democratic accountability in action. The borough entered election year under active statutory intervention. A Best Value Inspection published in November 2024 had documented serious governance failings under Mayor Lutfur Rahman’s Aspire administration: weak internal controls, a culture of concentrated executive authority, poor transparency, and slow responses to statutory recommendations. A further written ministerial statement in January 2026 confirmed ongoing failures and deteriorating financial governance. In March 2026 — just two months before polling day — the Secretary of State escalated the intervention, granting ministerial envoys enhanced powers to step in directly if the council continued to breach its Best Value Duty.

Then voters went to the polls and Aspire won 33 of 45 council seats. Lutfur Rahman was re-elected as Executive Mayor for a third time. Labour was reduced to five seats — its lowest total in the borough’s history.

I stood as the Labour candidate for Bethnal Green West in those elections. What I observed — during the campaign and in the results — reveals a deeper tension between statutory accountability and community-level democratic legitimacy: one with implications that reach well beyond Tower Hamlets.

The structural picture

The results reveal a distortion that deserves wider attention. Aspire secured 73 per cent of council seats with just over 32 per cent of the vote. Labour and the Green Party each received just under 23 per cent of the vote, yet each won only 11 per cent of seats. In ward after ward, the combined Labour and Green vote exceeded Aspire’s total — yet the block voting system used in multi-member wards — where each voter casts as many votes as there are seats and the top candidates win — converted vote fragmentation into a decisive seat bonus for the incumbent. This is sometimes called plurality block voting, and it rewards coordinated slate-voting, which incumbent parties with strong voter loyalty are structurally better placed to exploit.

The ward-level picture sharpens this further. In Bethnal Green West, Labour entered polling day with an estimated core vote of around 540; Aspire’s coordinated bloc was already three times that size, with split votes running into the thousands. Green candidates who had run no sustained local campaign outpolled every Labour candidate standing — a pattern repeated across wards throughout the borough. The block voting system had no mechanism to reward breadth of engagement or effort: it simply rewarded the most organised and unified voting bloc.

It is worth distinguishing block voting in multi-member wards from single-member first-past-the-post. The coordination premium is structurally higher: a cohesive 32 per cent bloc can sweep three seats simultaneously in a way that would not occur in a series of individual contests. The question this blog is asking is not primarily about proportionality per se, but whether the electoral system can transmit accountability signals when a council is under active statutory intervention for documented governance failure.

This points to a question the electoral systems literature and the local democracy literature have rarely addressed together: when opposition parties are structurally disadvantaged by electoral mechanics, what additional tools does a democratic accountability framework need?

The accountability paradox

A long line of research — from Fiorina’s retrospective voting model through Powell and Whitten’s clarity-of-responsibility framework — establishes that electoral punishment for governance failure is neither automatic nor uniform. Recent scholarship sharpens this further: voters weigh integrity against perceived competence and community delivery (Breitenstein and Hernández, 2024); punishment weakens when opposition is fragmented and alternation unclear (Otjes and Stiers, 2022); and elections are in any case a blunt accountability instrument compared to courts, oversight bodies, and civic challenge (Papadopoulos, 2023). The established literature identifies three conditions that must be met for punishment to occur: voters must have clear information about failure; they must be able to attribute responsibility to the correct actor; and accountability must not be crowded out by competing loyalties or trade-offs. Tower Hamlets 2026 illustrates the failure of all three conditions simultaneously.

Yet the Tower Hamlets case also points to a fourth condition, largely absent from the existing retrospective voting literature: the accountability mechanism itself must be seen as legitimate by the communities it is meant to protect. This is the accountability paradox at the heart of the 2026 result — and it is a contribution that the standard retrospective voting framework is not equipped to capture.

For intervention to function as a democratic corrective, it must be perceived by the electorate — and particularly by the communities most affected by governance failure — as rational, impartial, and operating in their interests. Where that perception fails, intervention becomes politically legible as external imposition, and voting for the incumbent becomes an act of community solidarity rather than an endorsement of governance failure. This dynamic is not accidental: it is actively constructed through political framing, and incumbents with strong identity-based bonds with their electorate are structurally well-placed to construct it.

Recent research on statutory intervention in English local government proposes a five-stage model — crisis revelation, delegitimisation, imposed reforms, capacity building, and restoration — and argues that interventions must be carefully designed to appear rational rather than political if they are to maintain rather than undermine faith in local democracy (Lowther, Joyce and Whiteman, 2025). That model’s second stage — delegitimisation — describes central government’s work to undermine the legitimacy of the council being intervened in. What the Tower Hamlets 2026 election reveals is that delegitimisation can also operate in the opposite direction: the incumbent successfully turned the intervention itself into the object of delegitimisation in the eyes of the electorate, making the accountability mechanism the thing that lacked legitimacy rather than the council it was designed to hold to account.

Conversations on the doorstep revealed the depth of this reframing. Many Aspire supporters had not engaged with the contents of the Best Value report because they had already concluded the report itself was politically motivated — a tool of mainstream parties who disapproved of what Aspire represented rather than a genuine accountability mechanism. More striking still, when specific governance failures were raised — including nepotism and unqualified appointments — some voters had internalised a counter-narrative in which such practices represented community protection rather than misconduct.

It would be reductive to dismiss these perceptions as simply the product of misinformation. Communities with long experience of political marginalisation may have genuine historical grounds for scepticism toward central government intervention, and those experiences shape how accountability claims are received. What the Tower Hamlets case illustrates is the extent to which this pre-existing disposition was mobilised and amplified through deliberate political communication — producing not political apathy but the successful reconstruction of what accountability itself means.

This is not unique to Tower Hamlets. It is a dynamic that researchers of democratic resilience and local governance are increasingly attentive to, and it raises important questions about how accountability mechanisms are designed, communicated, and embedded — questions that are as much about institutional culture and civic trust as they are about statutory frameworks.

Tower Hamlets in context

Tower Hamlets did not stand alone in 2026. The elections produced historic Green gains across inner London — in Hackney, Waltham Forest, Lewisham and Southwark — and a significant realignment of the progressive vote away from Labour. What makes Tower Hamlets distinctive is that this regional realignment intersected with the specific dynamics of the Aspire incumbency, the governance intervention, and the structural incentives of block voting, producing an outcome more disproportionate than anywhere else in the capital.

Understanding whether Tower Hamlets represents an outlier or an advance indicator requires systematic comparison. Several English councils have been subject to statutory intervention in recent years — including Birmingham, Croydon, Slough, Sandwell, and Thurrock — yet the relationship between intervention, governance accountability, and subsequent electoral outcomes has received little comparative attention. Whether the accountability paradox identified here is specific to Tower Hamlets or reflects a broader pattern in how statutory intervention interacts with local political culture is a question that future comparative research must address.

The stakes

What the Tower Hamlets elections confirm, above all, is that democratic resilience is not reducible to electoral outcomes. The borough’s communities — residents navigating overcrowded housing, fractured services, and the cumulative pressures of one of England’s most deprived urban environments — continue to engage, organise, and hold their representatives to account through multiple channels. That engagement, not any single election result, is the foundation on which accountable local governance must ultimately be rebuilt.

What forms of accountability can work when statutory intervention loses legitimacy in the eyes of the very communities it is meant to protect?

Dr Gulay Icoz is a Visiting Research Fellow at Middlesex University London and stood as the Labour candidate for Bethnal Green West in the May 2026 local elections and Former Councillor in Hackney (2006–2014). She researches democratic resilience, local governance, and progressive voter realignment in inner London.

References

Academic sources

Breitenstein, S. and Hernández, E. (2024) ‘Too Crooked to be Good? Trade-offs in the Electoral Punishment of Malfeasance and Corruption’, European Political Science Review. doi:10.1017/S175577392400016X

Fiorina, M.P. (1981) Retrospective Voting in American National Elections. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Lowther, J., Joyce, P. and Whiteman, P. (2025) ‘Intervention 3.0: Designing a Responsive Model for Local Government Support in England’, INLOGOV Blog, 4 November 2025. Available at: https://inlogov.com/2025/11/04/intervention-3-0-designing-a-responsive-model-for-local-government-support-in-england/ [Also published as ‘How not to damage democracy’, Municipal Journal, 16 October 2025.]

Otjes, S. and Stiers, D. (2022) ‘Accountability and alternation: How wholesale and partial alternation condition retrospective voting’, Party Politics, 28(3), pp. 457–467.

Papadopoulos, Y. (2023) Understanding Accountability in Democratic Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (Elements in Public Policy).

Powell, G.B. and Whitten, G.D. (1993) ‘A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context’, American Journal of Political Science, 37(2), pp. 391–414.

Government documents

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2024) Best Value Inspection Report: London Borough of Tower Hamlets. London: MHCLG. November 2024.

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (2026) Written Ministerial Statement: Tower Hamlets Best Value Intervention. London: MHCLG. January 2026.

Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government (2026) Enhanced Intervention Powers: Tower Hamlets. Ministerial Announcement. March 2026.

What works in violence reduction? Learning from the London Vanguards evaluation

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Dr. Jason Lowther

This is the last (for now) of our series of blogs on recent evaluations of local public services – if you have published an evaluation you think may be of interest to Inlogov readers, please send me a link to it ([email protected]).

Much of the evaluation literature on violence reduction has focused on system-wide approaches such as Violence Reduction Units. The London Vanguards independent evaluation offers a close look at one defined service model designed to support children and young people affected by violence through integrated, community-based provision.

The London Vanguards programme, delivered across 12 boroughs between 2022 and 2025, brought together health, community and psychological support into a single, coordinated offer for young people at risk of, or affected by, violence. The independent evaluation, led by the Anna Freud Centre, used a mixed-methods realist design, combining service data with interviews and focus groups involving young people, families and practitioners. The aim was not only to assess outcomes, but to understand how and why the model worked in practice.

A holistic, multi-systems approach

At the core of the Vanguards model is a holistic understanding of violence risk. Rather than focusing narrowly on offending behaviour, the programme recognises that many young people experience multiple, overlapping adversities – including mental health needs, family instability, educational exclusion and unmet developmental needs.

The evaluation shows that this approach enabled services to identify needs that had often gone unrecognised elsewhere, particularly around neurodevelopmental conditions, speech and language difficulties and mental health. These underlying issues frequently shape both vulnerability to violence and the ability to engage with support.

The model therefore combined psychological support, practical help and wider system navigation, rather than relying on a single intervention. In doing so, it reflects a shift from treating violence as an isolated problem to addressing it as part of a wider set of life circumstances.

Outcomes: improvements across multiple domains

The evaluation presents a broadly positive picture of outcomes, although with important caveats around data completeness.

Around 1,500 children and young people were supported over the life of the programme. Among those with available data, there were reported improvements across several domains:

  • mental health improved for around 47 per cent of participants
  • education and accommodation outcomes improved for around one third
  • reductions in offending and high-risk behaviours were reported for a significant minority

Qualitative evidence reinforces these findings. Young people, parents and practitioners consistently described increases in confidence, wellbeing and sense of agency, as well as improvements in family relationships and engagement with education or employment.

Importantly, the evaluation suggests that these changes were not always short-lived. Many participants maintained positive outcomes over time, which was attributed to the longer-term, relationship-based nature of the support.

What drives change: relationships, persistence and coordination

Among the most valuable insights from the evaluation are those examining how change was achieved.

First, trusted relationships between practitioners and young people emerge as a central mechanism. The model’s flexible and persistent approach allowed practitioners to engage individuals who might otherwise disengage from services. This sustained engagement appears to be critical in supporting progress.  The importance of this relational approach to public services is increasingly recognised.

Second, multi-agency coordination proved essential. Although establishing partnerships was initially challenging, over time services became more aligned, enabling more coherent and responsive support. This coordination allowed practitioners to address needs across different domains without requiring young people to navigate multiple disconnected systems.

Third, the programme’s holistic design enabled it to respond to changing needs. Rather than fixed pathways, support could adapt as circumstances evolved, which is particularly important given the instability many participants experienced.

The data challenge: promising evidence, incomplete picture

As with many complex service evaluations, the report highlights limitations in the evidence base. Missing data rates are high across several outcome measures, and there is no control group for comparison. This makes it difficult to draw definitive conclusions about impact.

What does this mean for local authorities?

The London Vanguards evaluation suggests several lessons for local government and partners.

First, violence reduction is inseparable from wider needs. Effective responses must address mental health, development, family context and structural disadvantage alongside risk behaviours. Single-issue interventions are unlikely to be sufficient.

Second, relationship-based practice is central. The strongest evidence of change comes from sustained, trust-based engagement between practitioners and young people. This has implications for workforce stability, caseloads and commissioning approaches.

Third, integration works, but takes time. The evaluation shows that multi-agency coordination improved over time, but required sustained effort to establish.

Fourth, flexibility is a strength. The ability to adapt support to individual needs was a key feature of the model. Highly standardised approaches may struggle to achieve similar outcomes with complex populations.

Finally, the evaluation highlights the importance of taking a long-term view. Improvements were gradual, interconnected and not always immediately visible. This may challenge some performance frameworks but better reflects the reality of supporting young people affected by violence.

Taken together, the evidence from the London Vanguards suggests that what works in this area is not a single intervention, but a way of working: holistic, relationship-based and coordinated across services. The challenge for government and local authorities is creating the conditions to sustain this approach over time.