When paradiplomacy becomes a performative act: Istanbul’s Imamoglu and his quest against competitive-disharmony

Dr. Ahmet Cemal Erturk & Dr. Nur Sinem Kourou

Paradiplomacy involves multi-level actors in global politics and allows for local governance even within strict unitary state borders. These borders are sharper when regional or sub-national entities diverge from the central government’s policy position. Moreover, political constraints can be intimidation tactics, with authoritarian measures tightening control over municipal autonomy. Therefore, sub-national entities may adopt various strategies to bypass these limitations. Paradiplomacy could become a way out. Sub-national actors may take paradiplomacy as an outlet to counter political pressure and push back against central government authoritarianism. The opportunities created through paradiplomacy also bring local leaders to the forefront of foreign policy. Post-2019 Turkey stands as a benchmark for analysing this issue.

It would not be wrong to describe paradiplomacy as the lifeline of some local governments not aligned with Turkey’s ruling party after the 2019 local elections. Let us look at the background of the situation. AKP’s leading position in national and local governments since its first elections (2003 national, 2004 local) was shaken by the loss of metropolitan municipalities such as Istanbul and Ankara to the main opposition CHP in the 2019 local elections. Since then, a competitive-disharmony phase has opened between the CHP municipalities and the AKP government. In a pattern of competitive-disharmony, local leaders turn foreign relations into a political performance on stage. By strategically communicating and leveraging foreign ties for political gain, sub-national entities can demonstrate their ability to fulfill the needs of both domestic constituents and international partners, thereby positioning themselves to compete with the central government effectively.

The most notable politician in this respect has been Ekrem Imamoglu, the Mayor of Istanbul. This is not only because İmamoğlu is a skilful leader. In the absence of the backing of the national government to run a Megapolis like Istanbul, he has had to pursue other possibilities, making him the actor of paradiplomacy. Disharmony naturally emerges in these relationships, driven by state officials viewing sub-national authorities as existential threats. In centralized and authoritarian contexts, paradiplomacy within competitive-disharmony emerges in two critical areas of foreign policymaking: economic and political. Local leaders build reputations by overcoming these constraints while forging their path through diplomacy. In a sense, they endeavour to become actors in the game to avoid appearing as mere recipients of international actors. By doing so, they become the legitimate, albeit unofficial, government representative in the vacant areas.

The most recent example of this occurred last summer. President Erdoğan’s decision not to attend the 2024 Paris Olympics provided a diplomatic opening for İmamoğlu, who has consistently expressed his desire to host international events like the Summer Olympics. Riding the momentum of his victory in the March 2024 local elections, İmamoğlu travelled to Paris with nearly all CHP district mayors, supporting the national athletes and carving out a new space for diplomacy as he sets his sights on bringing the 2036 Olympics to Istanbul. Imamoğlu’s intention and diplomatic endeavours are also physically present in Paris under the name ‘İstanbul House.’ ‘İstanbul House’ was founded to showcase Istanbul’s sporting and cultural heritage and share the city’s future vision with the world. İmamoğlu’s high-profile involvement in the Paris Olympics and the opening of ‘Istanbul House’ was criticized as a ‘wasteful’ effort by people in Turkey who have struggled with the current economic crisis, yet from a diplomatic perspective, it was another step in the paradiplomacy he has been pursuing in since 2019.

Since the beginning of İmamoğlu’s tenure, instances such as the example of Paris have been evident. Economically, his first term has been marked by a persistent pursuit of external funding, with a focus on leveraging foreign sources such as Deutsche Bank and the French Development Agency. This strategy was designed to bypass the obstacles imposed by domestic funding authorities. Politically, İmamoğlu has also tested the limits of competition with the central government. In a highly unprecedented move in Turkish political history, he appeared as a guest speaker at the 2022 Munich Security Conference, where he outlined an agenda that directly challenged the government’s official foreign policy stance. His speech highlighted the growing democratic regression both domestically and globally, transforming his address into a cautionary narrative for those in attendance.

Although İmamoğlu still has four years remaining as Istanbul’s mayor, experts widely agree that his ambitions extend far beyond his current position. These aspirations are clearly reflected in his approach to paradiplomacy. While the volatility of Turkish politics leaves little room for certainty, one expectation remains clear: the longstanding tension between Erdoğan’s increasingly centralized government and İmamoğlu’s municipality is unlikely to dissipate. Considering the ambitious goals of both parties—one driven by a quest for power, the other by an insatiable pursuit of total hegemony—it is reasonable to expect that competition between the two will persist over the coming half-decade.

This blog post is based on Ertürk, A.C. and Kourou, N.S., 2024. Unlocking pathways in constrained local governance: exploring paradiplomacy under competitive-disharmony through the case of Istanbul. Local Government Studies, pp.1-22. Available here: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/03003930.2024.2377223

Dr. Ahmet Cemal Erturk is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at Istanbul Kultur University. He completed his Bachelor of Science degree in International Relations at Middle East Technical University, followed by a Master’s degree from the the University of Manchester and a second Master’s degree from the London School of Economics. Dr. Erturk further pursued his academic journey by obtaining a Ph.D. from the European Institute of Marmara University. Dr. Erturk’s research focuses on pivotal areas such as EU-Turkey relations, sustainable transport policies within the EU framework, and the process of Europeanization in Turkey.

Dr Nur Sinem Kourou is a lecturer at Istanbul Kültür University. She conducts research on the relationship between gender and politics, gender opposition, and women’s political participation in Turkey. Kourou completed Ph.D at Boğaziçi University in 2022. During their doctoral studies, she was a visiting researcher at Yale University. In 2022, Kourou received the Dicle Koğacıoğlu Article Award from Sabancı University’s Center for Gender and Women’s Studies Excellence, ranking first. Currently, she is a Postdoctoral Researcher on a research project supported by the British Academy

The Leadership Conundrum in Turkey’s District Governance – Insights from Doctoral Research

In this post Saban Akca presents findings from his recently completed PhD research into the behaviour of district governors in Turkey. His thesis is titled ‘The Complex Role of District Governors in Turkey: A Case of Sui Generis Public Leadership’. 

Turkish district governors are centrally appointed public administrators who represent the Turkish state at localities across the country. They have been charged with various and diverse responsibilities, including security and public order, and they are liable to ensure the smooth delivery of other public services. However, they have enjoyed a great deal of power in local administration for more than 170 years, their co-existence with locally elected mayors and the latter’s unparalleled and rapid accumulation of power are now hitting hard the very existence of the orthodox foundation of governorships nationwide.

After this brief introduction about the roles of the Turkish governors I am now ready to explain why I have been conducting a leadership study on them. First, it should be underlined here that the study – based on my personal experiences of the perceived inadequacy of training services delivered by the Training Department of the Turkish Interior Ministry for intern governors –aimed to examine a specific ‘governorship course’. However, the direction of the study evolved into one that focuses also on governor leadership exercises, mostly because the course is a mere mannequin of the status quo, rather than a transformative leadership programme.

The study has focused on the challenge within public leadership of reconciling the sometimes conflicting interests of the national and local state. As representatives of the Turkish state at the local level, governors have undertaken a traditional local leadership role. The research for the study has examined the ways in which different governors interpret, approach and play out their leadership roles within the districts to which they are appointed, and, in particular, the ways in which they balance the respective interests of the central state with those of the locality, as shaped by the democratically elected local government system.

Much of the research focus has been on governors as individuals – rather than as a group or as an institution. In this vein, the key research question for the thesis has been ‘How do Turkish governors, in the exercise of their leadership role, balance out their responsibilities towards the central government, as servants of the central state, with those towards the locality and the communities over which they have jurisdiction?’ In addition to that and in further elaboration of governors’ leadership characters and the effects of contingencies on their leadership, the second research question is: ‘To what extent, and in what ways, are differences in the approach of governors shaped by and contingent on local circumstances as opposed to more personal traits?’.

A case study design was devised, involving 30 district governors, selected from across Turkey, and semi-structured interviews were conducted with each to explore both the perceptions and perspectives of each with regard to their leadership role and the extent to which these differed from district to district in reflection of contextual factors.

The findings demonstrated a considerable range in perspectives on and approaches to the leadership role and in the strategies and modes of operation in the pursuit of governance at local level. At the same time, the findings also highlighted some commonalities; for example, a strong ambition from an early age amongst some to become a district governor. Similarly, there was shared recognition of the importance of the adaptability of leadership strategies to local circumstances, and recognition that there cannot be ‘one model’ for this governance role. Furthermore, the findings suggested that district governors tend to approach their role as father figures, for the district population as well as for their own civil servant employees.

Recent public administration reforms in Turkey, and specifically, moves to devolve more powers to municipalities, imply changes in the role and influence of district governors. Accordingly, the research sought to understand how interviewees were viewing these changes and their implications for their role into the future. In this respect, almost all the governors expressed apprehension and much uncertainty about future prospects.

 

Saban

Saban Akca holds a law degree from the University of Ankara, Turkey and did his master study on the European Union at the Keele University in 2011. After achieving his lawyer qualification at the Ankara Bar Chamber in 1999, he followed a career in the Turkish civil service as a district governor from 2000 until 1 September 2016.

De-reformation of the Local Government System in Turkey?

Saban Akca

Local government in Turkey has a two-headed structure: a centrally appointed governor with a plethora of responsibilities on the one hand and popularly elected municipal authorities on the other. This dualism dates back to the days of the Ottoman Empire, but in this blog I am not going to barge into historical details; rather I will discuss the current situation of the Kurdish municipalities that are now being seized one by one by Mr Erdogan, the Turkish President, and his political party, the AKP (Justice and Development Party), particularly after an infamous coup attempt last July. An upcoming referendum on 16 April this year – which is considered a pivotal move for transforming the country’s democratic parliamentary system to a presidency and creating a powerful sultan-president – will be also taken into consideration.

In the immediate aftermath of the coup, Mr Erdogan and his government started a brutal witch-hunt against all dissenters in Turkey, including liberals, leftists, seculars and followers of the Gulen Movement. Tens of thousands of public servants have been dismissed for allegedly being behind the coup and most of them arrested on not-so-clear charges. Their names have been publicised on the Turkish Official Gazette and almost everybody now treats them as terrorists or traitors. Companies that are deemed to be associated with the Gulen Movement have had their assets seized, been filled with appointed trustees and finally sold. Journalists have been jailed as their newspapers and TV stations have been closed down. The country is now in a constant state of emergency rule, in which everything is done with decrees streaming down from the presidential palace and where all kinds of illegalities committed by authorities are protected.

Municipal authorities in predominantly Kurdish towns and cities have their shares in these atrocities. After sending Kurdish deputies to jails, the government began to seize power in Kurdish local governments, particularly in the east and south-east of the country. Elected mayors have been replaced by appointed trustees, chosen from local governors in districts or provinces. However, removing mayors did not suffice, so they were jailed too.

Under the stretched state of emergency rule, with no visible and effective opposition remaining, Turkey is holding a referendum to turn its current political system into a presidency. This, unsurprisingly, will work best for the benefit of Mr Erdogan, who is trying to establish a de-facto sultanate. However, one of his referendum promises is to increase the number of greater municipal authorities by over 20, from the present 31. Considering that the country has 81 provinces, increasing the number of popularly elected local municipalities and enlarging their responsibilities across the provincial border is a bold move and may transform the local administration system and add more fuel to the discussion of devolution that has emerged since the 1980s.

The President’s referendum promises and his seizing of popularly elected municipal authorities in the country’s Kurdish regions represents a very problematic sphere in Turkish politics in terms of the empowerment of local governments. Increasing the numbers of democratically and locally elected mayors and devolving power to municipal authorities, as well as enlarging their territories and overlapping provincial borders is a powerful move in the case of strengthening local government reforms. However, only time will tell whether Mr Erdogan and his government are only merely tolerating those who he considers to be his political allies in local governments across Turkey. What we can say though is that this move will certainly bring more uncertainty to the country’s already troublesome local government system.

 

Saban Akca is a doctoral researcher in INLOGOV at the University of Birmingham. His research focuses on leadership in public administration, and his doctoral thesis examines the leadership exercises of local-level district governors in Turkey.