Damaged reputations (and how to repair them)

21/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

Ian Briggs

During a recent conversation with a senior product development engineer who works for a high end vehicle manufacturer, the importance of ‘halo products’ opened up an interesting conversation. Investment in such ‘halo’ products is a given in a highly competitive marketplace and the known impact they have on consumer behaviour is a strong justification for the high levels of investment needed in them.

The conversation turned to the near universally low esteem that this talented, hard working professional engineer held local public services in. To him, they were poorly managed, overly costly and rarely related to the wants and needs of the local people. Perhaps I should not have been surprised that he held this view but I did ask him if there was anything he really valued about local public services.

There was very little, but one service emerged as something that he did value – the local Fire and Rescue Service. He could find little to criticise about them. He cited a number of times that he was called upon to work professionally with them, and he saw them as having a very high level of professionalism when exploring vehicle safety issues. Any cut backs in this service he felt was poor political judgement. He was continually impressed by them and appreciated that in many cases the conditions within which they worked were challenging, dangerous and above all professionally demanding.

So why, if within the case he was putting forward that in the commercial sector investment in halo products and services is seen as a key way of leading and managing the overall brand, did the public sector not think and behave in the same way?

This contrasts with two papers that have crossed my desk recently. In both cases a strong argument is put forward for increasing the importation of private sector talent into the public service. However, in both cases the argument centres around the skills that commercial managers and leaders have in controlling inputs whilst at the same time improving the outcome quality of products and services. No mention is made of strategic investment in halo products and understanding of how careful promotion of those products and services that are known to be valued, even by those who consume products lower down the range, have a positive impact on overall consumer behaviour.

We did go on to discuss how the reverse could be true; could poor product perception have a negative impact upon products and services across the brand? The answer was a clear yes but the means by which this was countered was revealing. He cited cases of increasing management and leadership attention on those products and services that are valued. Clearly this has to be done simultaneously with rectifying where possible poor product and service across the portfolio, but it makes me reflect upon the tactics we apply in public service management. Are we missing a trick? The media is full of challenging stories of very serious public sector failure and the reputational damage that the NHS is suffering is potentially immense, as are sections of local government and other governmental agencies. But within this there seem to be few issues that lead to reputational harm to the Fire and Rescue Services – although I do not wish to tempt fate here!

So, should we explore this transferability of positive product and service a little more closely? My product engineer friend said that lessons could be learned in how these high value products are developed – in certain cases the positive impact of the product was achieved through a ‘less is more’ approach. Consumer behaviour can be positively impacted on by taking out unnecessary or unappreciated elements of a product or service; this is perhaps counterintuitive but is now an established mechanism for commercial organisations. The giving of more or adding more leads to a rapid acceleration of wants and needs but positively promoting the efficiency of a product that closely matches the expectation of the consumer adds value.

It would appear that within the highly tuned commercial mindset the notion of meeting the needs of the consumer is not always about the surprise and delight extras that are offered, but rather exists within the precise tailoring of need to product – even if somewhat perversely it may cost the provider more to take things out than to put additional things in.

What seems to be key here is the amount of attention that is paid to understanding what you do well whilst at the same time seeking address what you may not do so well. This is a principle that is commonly adopted in commerce – it is drawn from the theoretical perspective of ‘appreciative enquiry’ – seeking to understand what is positive and then taking active steps to deploy the factors that lead to success. There is an extensive literature on the subject that rarely seems to have an airing in public management circles, but perhaps this is something that we could learn from other sectors.

The key point here seems to be the accepted dimension of the transferability of reputations, both positive and negative, and the need for commercially savvy organisations to pay close attention to the ‘halo’ product and service. If that positive transferability is a reality then we should perhaps pay more attention to where we are succeeding and achieving high reputational advantage, even if the media still wants to pay rightful attention only to those areas where we may deserve a poor reputation. Maybe it could be a case of not seeking to import private and commercial sector savvy to wider public services, but to recruit more fire-fighters into wider public sector jobs.

Ian Briggs is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Local Government Studies. He has research interests in the development and assessment of leadership, performance coaching, organisational development and change, and the establishment of shared service provision.

Hashtag politics: seven top tips for civil servants using social media

20/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

Stephen Jeffares

The Commons public administration select committee’s call for open policymaking, published on 3 June, envisages civil servants as the guardians of wiki-style policymaking, with public sector leaders embracing digital technologies and using platforms such as Twitter and Facebook.

But these social media platforms can be a double-edged sword for policymakers.

Never has it been easier, or cheaper, to launch or consult on new policy initiatives. The possibility of creating a hashtag and reaching both the influencers and the wider public is seductive. Yet it can also result in something close to a Dr Frankenstein scenario: you have created a hashtag, and it will destroy you!

Once unleashed, public, tag-able, searchable and unique policy ideas are vulnerable to all kinds of comment, including critique and derision. Keeping abreast of what is being said about your initiative, activity or organisation can be difficult when you are busy with everyday matters, as former BBC director general George Entwistle found to his cost.

The rise of social media has brought with it a goldrush, with numerous companies and social media consultants offering “social listening” technologies, related advice and services. These tools can be configured to alert organisations of both positive and negative discussion of their initiatives, opening up opportunities to capitalise or take action. Metrics are provided to show the most influential users discussing an initiative, and who should be approached to help spread the message.

New tags are created daily – #compassionatecare, #MyPCC, #Greendeal, and, a personal favourite, the probation-related tag #transformingrehabilitation, which takes up 20% of a tweet.

Succeeding at hashtag politics is challenging. Here are my top tips:

1. Acknowledge the craft

In the battle to disseminate a message in a competitive environment with multiple channels and information overload, the creation of effective labels – such as hashtags – for policy ideas is part of the craft of policymaking.

2. Expect and accept some loss of creative control

Since its inception, big society has been frequently criticised as nebulous and vague. However, vagueness is part of the appeal of a policy idea. Its very nebulousness is what draws people to it and allows them the important opportunity to attach their own meanings and demands. Organic labels, hashtags and alternative meanings will arise. Take, for example, the Home Office’s #MyPCC, which was usurped by #PCC.

3. Listen

Invest modest resources in social media monitoring software, but, more importantly, recruit and train policy researchers to integrate new forms of data into their work.

4. Diversify

Hashtag policymaking is more about creating memorable policy ideas than explicit hashtags. Following one hashtag or set of users is not enough. You have to adapt to changing language to be able to capture the conversation.

5. Peek under the hood now and again

Do not rely solely on automated analytics, such as sentiment monitors, when making decisions.

6. Engage more and broadcast less

Be prepared to engage in informal discussion with citizens, without the need for approval from above. Waiting three days for sign off to reply to a Facebook comment is not engagement.

7. Be prepared to let go

Every day your initiative is online, accept that attachment to policy ideas is gradual, cumulative and eventually disruptive. Learn to recognise when the policy idea is entering its final stages, be prepared to disinvest, and do not mislead your collaborators.

This post was originally published by the Guardian Public Leaders’ Network.

Stephen Jeffares is a Roberts Fellow in the College of Social Sciences based in INLOGOV, Institute for Local Government Studies. His fellowship focuses on the role of ideas in the policy process and implications for methods. He is a specialist in Q methodology and other innovative methods to inform policy analysis.

What do MMR and personal budgets have in common?

12/06/201319/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

Catherine Needham

The recent spike in measles cases in Swansea and elsewhere has a particular salience for local government, occurring just as authorities took on new responsibilities for public health. Events in Swansea brought back into public attention the decline in uptake of the MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella) vaccine that followed a spate of media stories several years ago reporting an apparent link to autism. Despite the thorough discrediting of the link, MMR take-up rates have not recovered.

Declining rates of vaccination are not a UK-phenomenon and cannot wholly be laid at the door of a single rogue study. Research that I have been doing with Anat Gofen from Hebrew University in Jerusalem has highlighted that vaccination rates are dropping across western democracies. Often, in each country, the decline will be associated with a particular vaccine and a set of commonly circulating myths surrounding it. In the US, for example, it has been a rise in cases of whooping cough that has provoked most concern.

Whilst vaccine take-up rates have always been low within some disadvantaged communities, what has grown is the prevalence of parents practicing a form of so-called ‘scientific citizenship’, in which they research issues for themselves, make use of official and oppositional websites, and weigh the perceived risks. They may opt to delay the jabs until a child is older or to split combined vaccines into separate shots rather than not vaccinate at all. If they decide not to proceed with vaccination, they will find an online community of fellow resistors with whom to share stories and provide support.

What has this got to do with personal budgets in social care services? In both cases, citizens are challenging conventional notions of professional expertise and authority, and making a claim to know what is best for them and their families.

The two cases have many dissimilarities: accepting that older people and people with disabilities know best about their immediate care needs and should have choice and control about how they spend their time is clearly very different from accepting that parents know best about a medical intervention like vaccination. Personal budgets have been the culmination of many years of campaigning by disability organisations for recognition that the person using services is an “expert on their own life” and has widespread support in government and civil society. Vaccine refusal is a widely criticised activity with dangerous consequences for public health.

However for health and social care professionals on the frontlines, navigating the boundaries of citizen expertise is a growing challenge. With personal budgets expanding into the NHS as personal health budgets, it is no longer assumed that health interventions should always be determined on the basis of a traditional clinical evidence base. Like ‘expert patient’ programs, health budgets have been principally targeted at people with chronic conditions which require self-management and enable them to develop knowledge over the long-term. Other areas of health, such as vaccination, remain off limits.

However, citizens themselves may not accept this demarcation. Declining vaccination rates highlight the difficulties that officials face in attempting to ‘hold the line’, encouraging citizen expertise in some sectors of health and care whilst denying it in others. There are challenges for practitioners in explaining why you can be an expert patient but not an expert parent.

Catherine Needham is a Senior Lecturer at the Health Services Management Centre, University of Birmingham, and is developing research around public service reform and policy innovation. Her recent work has focused on co-production and personalization, examining how those approaches are interpreted and applied in frontline practice. Her most recent book, public by the Policy Press in 2011, is entitled, Personalising Public Services: Understanding the Personalisation Narrative.

Some seasonal thoughts on definitions of plagiarism and fraud

07/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

Chris Game

In the higher education world June means two things: the assessment season and the publication of university league tables. We had the Guardian University Guide rankings this week and here at the University of Birmingham we were very excited, having apparently shot up in a single year from 30th out of 119 institutions to 15th rankings. We seem to have cracked the system, so watch out, Oxbridge, here we come!

Rigorous assessment, as the Education Secretary regularly reminds us, is a vital part of any educational package, and certainly in HE it’s guaranteed to appeal to fee-conscious parents, if not necessarily to their prospective student offspring. Here in my little corner of the university, therefore, we like to feel we’ve done our bit towards our university’s startlingly improved ranking with our work on rooting out and publicising plagiarism.

Go too deeply into it and plagiarism – appropriating someone else’s work, language, thoughts, ideas, or whatever as your own – can quickly become over-complicated. What counts as a thought? Can you plagiarise yourself? Is wrongful appropriation a crime or an ethical lapse? So we try to keep it simple: it’s cheating, it’s bad, and the more of it you detect, the better.

In what we might call the dark ages, plagiarism rates were the numbers or percentages of all students’ marks that, on investigation, were found to be higher than they should have been, due to the students having cheated. Regrettably, because either our investigations were insufficiently diligent or students weren’t actually cheating that much, the rates were mostly pretty low and risked making us look careless about these matters.

How, then, could these disappointingly low rates be boosted without actually forcing students to cheat? Easy! What we’re really interested in is detecting marks wrongly assigned. But ‘wrongly assigned’ makes it seem as if we, not students, are responsible, so let’s keep the useful term ‘plagiarism’, but extend it to include ALL marks that were found to have been wrongly assigned.

So, if a student falsely claims to have handed work in on time, thereby avoiding a mark penalty for late submission, that’s plagiarism. If our external examiner finds we’ve over-marked an assignment, that’s plagiarism. If the Examinations Office incorrectly records or transcribes a mark, that’s plagiarism. The result: we’ve got stats that plagiarism detection software manufacturers would kill for.

At which point, I should emphasise, at John McEnroe-like volume, I AM NOT BEING SERIOUS!! Or rather, I am being serious, but not about plagiarism. Almost everything in the last few paragraphs – apart from the UoB’s Guardian ranking – derives from my warped imagination.

However, rewrite those paragraphs, replacing plagiarism or intellectual fraud with ‘benefit fraud’, and you’ve got a fair description of how in the real world Ministers and the media manipulate statistics to get them to tell a more convenient story. In brief, if you bundle various unrelated activities together and label them collectively as ‘fraud’, then feed the numbers to the media, you can have voters baying for all the benefit cuts you were going to introduce anyway.

Let’s take the most recent benefit fraud outrage panic, prompted by the release of some latest figures by the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) hard upon the manslaughter trial revelations of benefit scrounger Mick Philpott. The Daily Telegraph went with “Fraudulent and wrong benefit claims hit £3.5 billion record”. The Daily Express launched a “Call for new blitz on benefits to cut £3.6 billion fraud bill”.

Don’t bother about the slight statistical discrepancy; we’ll come back to it shortly. Besides, what does the odd hundred million matter when most of your readers presumably subscribe broadly to the average view of respondents in a recent YouGov/TUC survey: that 41% of the entire welfare budget goes on benefits to unemployed people, and that 27% of the welfare budget is claimed fraudulently.

In fact, DWP statistics show that of the total 2012/13 welfare budget of £167 billion, nearly half (£80 billion) went on state pensions, 14% on housing benefit, 8% on disability living allowance, 5% on pension credits, and 3% each (just over £5 billion) on jobseeker’s allowance, income support, and council tax benefit. The TUC’s ‘correct’ answer to its ‘benefits to unemployed people’ question is the 3% for jobseeker’s allowance, and even if this does, perhaps misleadingly, ignore other benefits for which the unemployed may qualify, it’s still massively closer to the true picture than 41%.

As for the popular guesstimate of 27% of the welfare budget going in fraudulent claims, the DWP’s more evidence-based estimate is contained in the annual publication referred to above, the clue to which is in its title: Fraud and Error in the Benefit System. Yes, it covers fraud, but its purpose is to measure the total cost to the taxpayer of all incorrect benefit payments made, whatever the cause – and, most importantly, to distinguish between those causes.

The preliminary estimate for 2012/13 is that total over-payment due to fraud and error across all benefits was £3.5 billion, or 2.1% of the total welfare budget. That’s where the Daily Telegraph’s figure came from, except that the paper didn’t bother clarifying that only a third of it was actually the result of deliberate claimant fraud. The other two-thirds were caused by claimant error with no fraudulent intent, and error by DWP or local authority officials.

Moreover, non-fraudulent claimant and official errors were also responsible for under-payments of £1.4 billion, so the net cost to the taxpayer of all benefit fraud and payment error was £2.1 billion or a little under 1.3% of the total budget, with actual fraudulent claims being responsible not for £45 billion, which would be 27% of the budget, nor for £3.5 billion, but £1.2 billion or 0.7%.

Interestingly, the Daily Express recognised that £1.2 billion is the correct fraud figure, but, possibly not to be outdone by the Telegraph, they got their headline by trebling it to £3.6 billion to cover a three-year period.

It’s always tempting, when one knows roughly the respective figures, to compare benefit fraud and tax fraud – but not that easy. First, there’s the terminology. HMRC don’t investigate anything as crude as tax fraud. Rather, they measure tax gaps, between what should be and actually is collected, and talk only of people circumventing or evading paying their taxes. In 2010/11 they measured a tax gap of £32 billion, representing 6.7% of total tax liabilities, and 15 times the net benefit overpayment gap. As usual, by far the biggest gap was in VAT – £9.6 billion, or over 10% of the tax due.

When it comes to differentiating tax-circumventing behaviours, HMRC reckon that unambiguous tax evasion accounts for 46% of the gap, or £14.7 billion – although it seems unlikely that some of the other behaviours, like failure to take reasonable care, would be quite as sympathetically interpreted, were the perpetrators benefit claimants.

Time, I think, to make my own position clear. By trying to identify the most accurate recent measures in what is inevitably an immensely difficult and controversial policy field, I do not diminish in any way the financial, political or moral importance of either benefit or tax fraud. I welcome in particular The Local Government Fraud Strategy, both for the work that it is spearheading and for the increased knowledge and awareness to which it will lead.

My concern is with the deliberate distortion of public knowledge and awareness. Politicians, even Ministers, cannot be held entirely responsible for the public’s misconceptions of how the world works, but they can be criticised when they pander to those misconceptions by falsely presenting or encouraging the false presentation of their own figures. DWP Secretary Iain Duncan Smith – rebuked again only last month by the UK Statistics Authority for distorting his department’s figures on the impact of the benefits cap – and junior minister, Lord Freud, have both had publicly to apologise for exaggerating the extent of benefit fraud, so now they just rely on friendly media to do their dirty work for them. They, above all, should know that the subject’s importance deserves much better.

Chris is a Visiting Lecturer at INLOGOV interested in the politics of local government; local elections, electoral reform and other electoral behaviour; party politics; political leadership and management; member-officer relations; central-local relations; use of consumer and opinion research in local government; the modernisation agenda and the implementation of executive local government.

What is the place of emotion in the making of policy?

05/06/201305/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

Kevin Harris

In the years I spent shuttling between local initiatives in low income neighbourhoods and oddly clean cupboard rooms in Westminster, I never really cracked the way the experience of disadvantage was absorbed or dismissed as ‘personal’ and disconnected from policy.

You see this constantly in the skirmishes of local democracy of course – a local meeting where an officer or elected member gets a thorough bashing by a resident who’s living a kind of hell that current policies don’t address. Fierce steam gets released but policy is unaffected.

Such occasions can be off-putting for the well-meaning policy maker. I think most are aware of the gravitational effect here, caused often by internal pressures of work, of the risk of gradually becoming detached from local experience.

Politicians shield themselves from occasional bombardment, and disparage the ‘personal’ as ‘emotional’ while routinely exploiting examples through the media when it suits them to do so.

Sometimes politicians try to use public events to draw the sting of citizens’ anger, and occasionally find they’ve over-estimated their own political skills. When they view confrontation with residents as political sport and not as a chance to understand and address needs, that illustrates the tension I’m talking about.

At the same time, people who have profound experience of the failure of social systems to protect them, may not have the perspective that helps anyone relate it to policy in a meaningful way. But sometimes you hear a really considered, articulate exposition of experience that takes the personal and places it in a generalised policy context. That’s rare, and risks diluting the very emotion of lived experience that gives pertinent urgency to the cause. And often intermediaries, like housing workers say, who can speak the equivocal language of policy while combining understanding of several individual examples of disadvantage, can make contributions that are valued and welcomed by both sides.

So what is the place of emotion in the making of policy? Rosie Anderson has done some work on this ‘essential but difficult territory’ and TSRC have just published a fascinating paper based on policy making around poverty in Scotland (Summary; 4-page briefing; working paper). Emotional knowledge, she says, is frequently described by her informants as ‘ambiguous, unreliable and potentially overwhelming knowledge – in contrast with “rational” knowledge, which is the prerequisite for “professionalism” in policy-making and a necessity for making policy decisions.’ This sounds a lot like what Ivan Illich described as a ‘cognitive disorder’, resting on the illusion that

‘the knowledge of the individual citizen is of less value than the “knowledge” of science. The former is the opinion of individuals. It is merely subjective and is excluded from policies. The latter is “objective” – defined by science and promulgated by expert spokesmen. This objective knowledge is viewed as a commodity which can be refined… and fed into a process, now called “decision-making.” This new mythology of governance by the manipulation of knowledge-stock inevitably erodes reliance on government by people.” (Tools for conviviality, 1973).

Anderson makes the point that policy processes are contrived to exclude subjectivity and individuality. And if people are to engage with those processes, it’s hard to see what else they are to bring to them. I have been in public meetings where a roomful of people, having collectively an enormous wealth of knowledge about the local issues under discussion, have sat in disconnected silence because the language and process disenfranchised them at the very point they were supposed to be being ‘invited’ to participate. Even the most well-meaning policy makers can flounder at this point.

Conversely, there are those meetings which seem like unstructured and unruly free-for-alls, a sequence of barely related angry rants. As Anderson says,

‘In practice this process of moving from the particular and emotional to general and impersonal, so simple-sounding on paper, is actually very difficult to get right in the eyes of policy practitioners because of emotional knowledge’s ambiguous status in policy.’

Partly, I have no doubt, this is an educational issue. As I have said often before, too many of us emerge from the education system with no idea how local democracy functions. For a long time it’s been in the interests of politicians to keep things that way, although some of them appear to be less sure nowadays (that’s a network society effect, I think). And Anderson raises the question of how we provide better support for policy workers emotionally when they engage with such lived experience.

We’ve all talked about emotional intelligence over the years. But it strikes me as curious that no-one seems to have got to grips with this topic before. This is a hugely important site of conflict and potentially fruitful understanding, and Anderson has pin-pointed the significance of ‘the negotiation and policing of the boundary between “personal” and “professional” knowledge about social change.’

Kevin Harris runs a community development consultancy, Local Level, offering expertise and advice on community engagement, community cohesion, involvement and participation, and neighbourhood development. He has 25 years’ experience in community development with a particular emphasis on how people communicate, share information, and interact at local level. Kevin has published several books, chapters and articles, online articles for the Guardian, and reports to government. He is Senior Associate Consultant to Breslin Public Policy and co-founder of Networked Neighbourhoods. He was previously a British Library Research Fellow.

This post was previously featured on the Neighbourhoods blog.

The 13 NOC counties and unitaries: runners, riders and results

17/05/201305/06/2013 / inlogov / Leave a comment

[This post, incorporating the final results, was updated by the author on 5th June 2013]

Chris Game

In May 2010 David Cameron and Nick Clegg took just five days to form their national coalition. By contrast, starting in June 2010, the Belgians took 18 months to form theirs. English local government falls between the two.

It’s well over a month now since the national media completed their coverage of the local elections. They’d added up the seats won and lost by the various parties, calculated the national vote share they’d have received if the elections had been held in different parts of the country, and how many seats they’d have won in a 2015 General Election – but they left as unfinished business the 13 county and unitary councils they conveniently lumped together in their tables as ‘NOC’ (No Overall Control). And, though it was a short sprint by Belgian standards, it took most of that month for most of us to learn, in several of these 13 cases, the answer to that basic question the elections were supposedly about: who will actually govern?

The reasons are various: more parties, plus variegated independents, involved in negotiations; party leaders losing their own seats, or having to be re-elected or deposed at party meetings; and, above all, the fact that any inter-party agreements can only be officially implemented at pre-scheduled Annual Council Meetings, which, in some of the affected councils, only took place in the last week of May.

This blog attempts to fill in the gaps. It’s a kind of ‘runners and riders’ guide to the 13 county and unitary councils in which no single party has a majority of seats: how they got that way, and what subsequently happened.

First, the counties, in alphabetical order. CAMBRIDGESHIRE, along with Lincolnshire, Norfolk, and to a lesser extent East Sussex, was one of the previously staunchly Conservative counties that became hung largely as a result of being UKIPped. As the BBC map shows, this was a much patchier experience than was suggested by some commentators at the time – with 7 of the 27 counties still having no UKIP councillors at all and only 4, all in the south and east, having more than 10.

Source: BBC News

The Conservative leader, Nick Clarke, was one of those who lost his seat to UKIP, and the party’s remaining 32 seats left them well short of a majority. The new leader, Martin Curtis, wanted to go it alone as a minority administration, but the Independents ruled that out, while Labour and the Lib Dems refused to join UKIP in supporting an Independent-led non-Conservative rainbow coalition. Eventually, the Conservatives got half their cake: Curtis will head a minority administration for 12 months, but then UKIP’s preference, for ‘opening up’ council decision-making, kicks in and cabinets will be replaced by all-party committees.

In CUMBRIA, previously run by a Con/Lab/Independent coalition, the elections effectively reversed the standings of the Conservatives and Labour, with the latter regaining their customary position as largest party, and the slightly strengthened Lib Dems in the role of potential kingmakers. Under a new leader, Jonathan Stephenson, they opted for coalition with Labour, deputy leadership of the council, and four cabinet posts.

EAST SUSSEX is a much smaller council than Cambridgeshire, but proportionately the party arithmetic is broadly similar. Here, though, the other parties seem readier to accept a Conservative minority administration, and, as in Cambridgeshire, although a Conservative-UKIP deal could have produced a majority, none appears to have been seriously pursued.

GLOUCESTERSHIRE was a hung three-party council from 1981 to 2005, with Lib Dems generally the largest group – before, in 2009, the Conservatives suddenly took 42 of the then 63 council seats. The reduction of 10 seats, accompanying boundary changes, and the prospect of at least some recovery by Labour and possibly the Lib Dems led close observers to predict a return to NOC, and they were right. The Conservatives, though, will continue in office as a minority administration, and the Lib Dems as the main opposition party, miffed reportedly at a suspected Con-Lab deal over Scrutiny Management and other committee chairs.

Meanwhile, the county’s badgers, temporarily reprieved last autumn from the Government’s planned cull, seem to have lobbied with some effect in the elections, the new council voting by 25 to 20 with 7 abstentions to oppose the cull, now due to start later this month.

In LANCASHIRE Labour either controlled the council or were the largest party from 1981 until 2009, and were hoping to regain majority control in one go. Sensing a lifeline, the Conservatives tried talking with anyone who might be interested in forming what would presumably be an anti-Labour coalition. But the Independents didn’t want an alliance with anyone and in the end the Lib Dems agreed to support a Labour minority administration – support that will include Labour’s budget, but not necessarily much more.

LINCOLNSHIRE Conservatives are unused to coalition politics, but the party’s leadership reacted quickly to the loss of nearly half its seats by negotiating a coalition deal with the Lib Dems and Independents, before the 16 new UKIP members could even elect themselves a leader. In the week they spent doing so, the party’s regional chairman pooh-poohed on their behalf any coalition with the Conservatives, and effectively condemned them to opposition from a starting point that might have yielded rather more. The Lincolnshire Independents group were also outsmarted – three of their number breaking away to join the coalition, one with a seat in the cabinet, with rumours that others could follow them into what is still a group-with-no-name.

Across The Wash, in equally traditionally Conservative NORFOLK, the outmanoeuvred group were the Conservatives themselves. At a full council meeting, the party’s re-elected leader, Bill Borrett, apparently thought he had an agreement with the Lib Dems at least to abstain in any vote, thereby enabling him to head a minority Conservative administration. He hadn’t, and nor was he able to nail down a more explicit coalition agreement with the Lib Dems involving some key specified posts. By far the largest group thus finds itself in opposition to a minority coalition of Labour and the Lib Dems based on just 29% of council members.

UKIP’s 15 votes were needed to get this deal off the ground – plus support from the Greens and an Independent – and the UKIP group describes itself as part of the coalition. That part, though, involves no cabinet seats, but rather the achievement of a Cambridgeshire-style agreement to abolish cabinet government and return to a committee system this time next year.

Before the Conservatives swept into power in 2005, OXFORDSHIRE had been a hung council for 20 years. Labour’s comeback was limited, and, on a now a significantly smaller council, the Conservatives finished within one seat of retaining their overall majority – a position they’ve restored thanks to a CIA: a Conservative/Independent Alliance probably less alarming than it initially sounds. No cabinet seats are involved, but three Independents have agreed to work with a Conservative minority administration in the kind of ‘confidence and supply’ arrangement that many thought was as far as Cameron and Clegg would dare to go in 2010, and indeed to which they may still, before 2015, conceivably turn.

In WARWICKSHIRE Labour, though never the majority party, have regularly run the council as a minority and were hoping to regain this position. They didn’t, but they did do a deal with the Conservatives, the outcome being a Conservative minority administration, headed by the council’s first woman leader, Izzy Seccombe, with Labour holding the Scrutiny chairs, and the Lib Dems and Greens out in the cold, complaining of a stitch-up.

Now to the four hung unitaries. In BRISTOL Labour became again the largest single party and has agreed that two of its members should join Mayor George Ferguson’s all-party cabinet, which will now comprise 2 Labour members, 2 Lib Dems, I Conservative, and I Green. That may sound straightforward, but it most certainly wasn’t. Last November a similar proposal, though supported by Labour councillors, was overruled by the local party and eventually by the National Executive, and had cost the group its leader, Peter Hammond. It seems a sensible decision, but it would be surprising if that sentiment were shared universally within Labour circles.

In CORNWALL, as in Lincolnshire, some candidates continue running around long after the electoral music has stopped. Here, one of the elected Conservative members defected after 10 days to the Independents, bringing the latter group up to parity with the Lib Dems. This proved, though, less crucial than it might have, as both groups were already in discussions over some form of agreement – one possibility being an all- or multi-party rainbow alliance that could be presented to the public as a ‘Partnership for Cornwall’. What actually emerged was more mundane: an Independent/Lib Dem coalition with the more or less positive support of Labour, UKIP and Mebyon Kernow (the Party for Cornwall), the Conservatives having rejected as tokenism a scaled-back offer of two cabinet seats.

The ISLE OF WIGHT was once a Lib Dem showcase, controlled by the party either as a majority or in coalition for 16 years until 2005. It seems like history now, though, and this year’s election was largely about the exchange of seats between the Conservatives and Independents – the latter at least slightly helped by Labour and UKIP not contesting every seat that they might have done. The Island Independents, led by Ian Stephens, one of the possible beneficiaries of these arrangements, took over as easily the largest group, and will run the council as a minority administration – for the first time since 1973-77.

Having dominated the former county council, Labour will run unitary NORTHUMBERLAND for the first time as a minority administration, with the support of the three Independents – one of whom will be back as Chairman of Audit, the post she held as a Conservative councillor before resigning from the party following alleged victimisation by a senior colleague. And to think, there are some who say the local government world is boring.

INLOGOV Blog

The Institute of Local Government Studies, University of Birmingham