Policy analysis

What works in local growth and skills? Learning from recent evaluations

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Jason Lowther

Following the previous blog on homelessness and rough sleeping, this piece turns to another major area of local government activity: local growth and skills programmes. Here too, evaluation activity has expanded rapidly, with a mix of national frameworks, programme‑level syntheses and place‑based studies. Taken together, these evaluations offer a valuable, and still evolving, picture of what is working, what is proving harder, and what local systems actually need to deliver economic outcomes.

Four strands of evidence stand out.

MHCLG local growth evaluation

The MHCLG local growth evaluation programme is significant not just for its findings, but for its approach to evaluation itself. Rather than focusing on single programmes, it introduces a portfolio‑level strategy covering multiple funds aimed at improving sub‑national economic performance.

Recent work, including the process evaluation of the Local Growth Fund and Getting Building Fund, highlight both strengths and tensions in the model. Decentralised decision‑making and the “single pot” approach enabled locally tailored investment and stronger alignment with local strategies. Private sector involvement and local prioritisation were widely valued.  However, delivery was shaped by pressures to deliver “shovel‑ready” projects quickly, particularly in the Getting Building Fund, which sometimes limited strategic coherence and innovation. Governance arrangements, while locally responsive, were often complex, and approaches to monitoring and evaluation were variable. More broadly, the evaluation underlines the difficulty of measuring long‑term economic impact, particularly where interventions are diverse and outcomes unfold over many years.

Multiply deep dives (Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland)

The Multiply deep dives bring a skills and employability perspective, focusing on adult numeracy provision across the devolved nations. Multiply was a £559 million UK‑wide programme designed to improve functional numeracy, with flexible, locally designed delivery models.

The deep dives use qualitative case studies, interviews with delivery partners and analysis of monitoring data, focusing on one area in each nation and drawing on wider place‑level evidence. A central finding is that local flexibility enabled innovation, particularly in embedding numeracy in real‑world contexts such as employment, parenting or financial capability.

At the same time, the evaluations highlight familiar delivery challenges. Short delivery timescales, in some cases just a year, created pressure to scale quickly, often leading to adaptation of existing provision rather than genuinely new approaches. Partnership working across councils, colleges and the voluntary sector was essential but time‑consuming to establish. Engagement with target groups remained difficult, particularly where low confidence rather than low skill was the primary barrier.

Overall, the evidence suggests that contextualised, learner‑centred approaches are promising, but require time, trust and sustained funding to embed.

UK Shared Prosperity Fund (UKSPF) interim evaluation synthesis

The UKSPF interim synthesis report provides perhaps the most comprehensive current view, drawing together 34 place‑based evaluations across the UK. It focuses on process learning rather than impact, reflecting the relatively early stage of delivery.

A clear headline is the importance of local autonomy. Across almost all areas, the ability for Lead Local Authorities to design interventions around local needs was strongly valued, particularly compared to the perceived rigidity of previous EU funds. This flexibility supported alignment with local strategies, more responsive delivery, and better integration across policy areas.

Other success factors included strong local programme management teams, continuity of provision (using UKSPF to sustain previously funded services), and the ability to combine funding streams to create coherent local offers. However, challenges were equally consistent. Tight central government timelines constrained planning and procurement, limited consultation, and created recruitment difficulties. As with other programmes, evaluation and outcome measurement remained underdeveloped.

The synthesis highlights a key tension: local freedom within central constraints. While devolution of decision‑making was real, the operating environment still imposed significant limits on what places could achieve.

UKSPF place‑based evaluations

The place‑based evaluations add depth to this picture by examining how UKSPF worked in specific localities. Using mixed‑methods approaches – including contribution analysis, surveys, interviews and case studies – across 34 areas, they explore how combinations of interventions interact within local systems.

These studies show that outcomes are highly context‑dependent. In some areas, UKSPF supported visible improvements in community facilities, local business support, and employability outcomes. In others, impacts were harder to detect, reflecting both the early stage of delivery and the complexity of local economies. What emerges clearly is that programme success depends less on individual projects than on how they are aligned and sequenced locally.

The evaluations also reinforce the importance of existing capacity and partnerships. Areas with mature governance arrangements, strong voluntary sector links, and prior experience of managing regeneration funding were better able to mobilise quickly and deliver coherent programmes.

What does this mean for local authorities?

Across these evaluations, several consistent lessons emerge.

First, local flexibility works, particularly when supported by capacity and stability. Both UKSPF and Multiply demonstrate the value of devolved decision‑making. However, the benefits are uneven, depending on local capability, existing partnerships, and the time available to plan and deliver.

Second, time is the missing ingredient in local growth policy. Tight delivery timescales appear across all programmes, driving a focus on “shovel‑ready” activity, limiting innovation, and constraining partnership development. Economic change, skills development and behaviour change all take longer than funding cycles typically allow.

Third, integration matters more than individual interventions. The strongest evidence, particularly from the place‑based evaluations, is that impact depends on how interventions fit together. Skills, business support and community investment are interdependent, yet funding streams and evaluation frameworks often treat them separately.

Fourth, measurement remains a weak spot. Across the local growth portfolio, there are persistent challenges in demonstrating impact and value for money. This is partly methodological, but also reflects the reality that many outcomes (productivity, employment, resilience) are long‑term and influenced by wider factors.

Finally, these evaluations underline a familiar but important point: local systems deliver national priorities. Where programmes align with local strategies, build on existing partnerships and allow room for adaptation, they show promise. Where they are constrained by short timescales, fragmented funding or complex governance, delivery becomes more transactional.

The conclusions from the local growth and skills evaluations strongly align with, and are reinforced by last month’s excellent report from the Institute for Government, Designing and delivering employment support.  The IfG goes further in diagnosing why these issues persist and what structural reform is needed. Both emphasise the value of local flexibility, integration and tailoring to place, with the IfG explicitly arguing that strategic authorities are best placed to design joined‑up employment support aligned to local labour markets and services. Likewise, both bodies of evidence highlight fragmentation and poor coordination across programmes as major barriers, with the IfG noting longstanding failures to “shift the dial” despite multiple national schemes, echoing local growth evaluations on disjointed funding and siloed interventions. The IfG report places significant emphasis on the limits of centralised systems and the need for multi‑year funding, capability and accountability frameworks.

In short, the local growth evaluations provide grounded evidence of what works in practice, while the IfG report offers a more explicit systems diagnosis: that without sustained devolution, integration and long‑term investment, the conditions needed for those “what works” approaches to succeed will remain constrained.

What works in homelessness and rough sleeping

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Jason Lowther

We’ve just started a new series of Inlogov blogs summarising the growing body of evaluation evidence in local government, and what it tells us about how councils are learning what works. Nowhere is that learning more urgent or more complex than in homelessness and rough sleeping. A series of recent national evaluations provide a rich, if sometimes uncomfortable, picture of how programmes are operating on the ground, what difference they are making, and where the system continues to struggle. 

Systems‑wide evaluation of homelessness and rough sleeping

The systems‑wide evaluation represents a deliberate attempt to step back from individual programmes and understand homelessness as a complex, interconnected system rather than a set of discrete services. Led by the Centre for Homelessness Impact with research partners, the early reports combine systems‑mapping, policy analysis and qualitative fieldwork in five local authority areas.

The core finding is stark: the system is not working as intended. Public spending and organisational effort are disproportionately focused on crisis response rather than prevention, even though this approach places increasing pressure on local authorities and delivers poorer outcomes. Fragmented funding streams, short‑term grants and inconsistent incentives across departments actively undermine joined‑up working. The evaluation does find examples of strong local partnership practice,but these are often working around the system rather than being supported by it.

The central conclusion is that meaningful progress requires sustained, cross‑government commitment to prevention, better alignment between housing, health, justice and welfare systems, and a clearer understanding of how national policy choices shape local outcomes.

Rough sleeping and complex needs process evaluation

The rough sleeping and complex needs evaluation zooms in on services supporting people facing the most entrenched disadvantage. This process evaluation examined interventions funded through the Rough Sleeping Grant and Rough Sleeping Social Impact Bonds, focusing on people with co‑occurring mental health and substance misuse needs.

Using case studies across 12 areas, interviews with service users and staff, and cost analysis, the evaluation explored how different models worked in practice. It found that progress, including improved housing stability and engagement with services, was most likely where support was flexible, persistent and relationship‑based. Small caseloads, psychologically informed approaches and multi‑disciplinary working were all important.

However, delivery was often hampered by structural barriers beyond local control: gaps in mental health provision, restrictive criteria in mainstream services, workforce instability and the limitations of short‑term funding.

Rough Sleeping Initiative process evaluation

The Rough Sleeping Initiative (RSI) process evaluation complements earlier impact analysis by explaining how and why the initiative achieved results. While the impact evaluation estimated a significant reduction in rough sleeping in RSI areas, the process evaluation explored local delivery through surveys of all funded authorities and in‑depth qualitative case studies.

Local authorities consistently reported that RSI funding enabled them to expand outreach, create specialist roles, and strengthen partnerships with health and voluntary sector providers. Rapid mobilisation, local flexibility and visible political commitment were key strengths. Many areas highlighted the value of multi‑disciplinary teams and assertive outreach in engaging people who had been sleeping rough for long periods.

At the same time, the evaluation identified familiar challenges: recruitment difficulties, reliance on short funding cycles, and the risk of losing skilled staff when funding ends.

Next Steps Accommodation Programme evaluation (briefing paper)

The Next Steps Accommodation Programme (NSAP) evaluation focuses on what happened after the incredible emergency response of “Everyone In” during the Covid pandemic lockdowns. It draws on two waves of interviews with service users in 34 local authorities, around 12 and 18 months after they were placed in longer‑term accommodation.

The findings are cautiously positive. Many people reported improved stability, safety and wellbeing, and a reduced use of emergency services. Sustained accommodation outcomes were more likely where individuals received ongoing, tailored support alongside housing. However, the evaluation is clear about its limits: the absence of baseline data, attrition over time, and the likelihood that those still in contact with services are the “success cases”.

Crucially, it highlights risks to sustainability, particularly affordability pressures, isolation, and unmet support needs.

Capital Letters process evaluation

The Capital Letters process evaluation adds an important organisational and commercial dimension to the evidence base. Capital Letters was established in 2019 as a borough‑owned, non‑profit company to reduce homelessness and temporary accommodation use in London by collectively procuring private rented sector homes, reducing competition between boroughs and driving better value for money.

The evaluation, based on interviews with boroughs, board members, landlords and MHCLG officials, alongside document and performance data review, focuses on how the initiative was set up, governed and sustained. It finds that Capital Letters had early success in demonstrating the potential of scale, shared negotiation and coordinated landlord engagement. Boroughs valued the ambition to change market dynamics rather than simply manage them.

However, the evaluation also highlights significant challenges. Achieving financial self‑sufficiency while meeting social objectives proved extremely difficult, particularly in a highly pressured London housing market. Tensions emerged between commercial risk, borough expectations and the constraints of homelessness legislation. Governance and accountability arrangements were complex, and uneven borough engagement limited the company’s ability to operate at the scale originally envisaged. Ultimately, despite grant support, Capital Letters was unable to become financially sustainable and subsequently wound down operations in 2025.

What does this mean for local authorities?

Read together, these evaluations paint a coherent but challenging picture of what local government can do in homelessness and rough sleeping.

First, prevention and system change demand stability. The biggest barriers to progress lie beyond individual projects. Short funding cycles, fragmented policy levers and misaligned national incentives consistently undermine local efforts, even where practice is strong. Councils can innovate, but without longer‑term certainty the system pulls them back towards crisis response.

Second, relationships and capability are critical. Outreach teams, assertive support for people with complex needs, and sustained tenancy support all rely on skilled staff, trust and persistence. These are precisely the elements most at risk from time‑limited programmes and competitive commissioning.

Third, housing supply and affordability are constraints. The Rough Sleeping Initiative and Next Steps evaluations both underline that service innovation only works when there are viable move‑on options. Capital Letters reinforces this at a system level: even ambitious collective approaches struggle when the underlying market is stacked against local authorities.

Fourth, collaboration is necessary but tricky. Whether through multi‑disciplinary teams or borough‑owned companies, partnership working requires time, governance capacity and shared risk. The evidence suggests collaboration works best when it is supported by clear national frameworks, realistic financial models and space to mature, rather than when it is required to develop and achieve results rapidly.

Finally, these evaluations show the growing value of learning‑focused evaluation in local government. They do not offer simple answers or “magic bullet” models. Instead, they help councils articulate what they are already experiencing on the ground and provide credible evidence to challenge policies and funding arrangements that make homelessness harder, not easier, to resolve.

The learning is no longer about whether local authorities know what works. It is about whether the wider system will allow them to do it.

What Works?  Local Government is Finding Out

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Jason Lowther

At last month’s Smith Square debate, we had an interesting discussion (among other themes) on how innovation spreads.  I mentioned that I was frustrated at the lack of traction that many evaluation reports seem to get, and that so many basically say “we don’t know so probably do more research”.  However, over the last 18 months, government has released a wave of evaluation evidence across multiple themes that are priorities for local government.  Partly in answer to my challenge, over the next few weeks we’ll be looking at what each of these can tell us about “what works” in their area: homelessness and rough sleeping, local growth and skills programmes, democratic engagement, the Community Ownership Fund (COF), and others.

This week, I’ll have a go at seeing the story the collection as a whole might be telling us about the pressures, strengths and future direction of local government systems. They reveal a landscape where councils are doing a great deal right, but also where structural conditions, funding models and capacity constraints limit what even the best local practice is able to achieve.

A shared diagnosis: rising demand, systemic pressure and fragmented delivery

Most of the recently published evaluations echo the same system‑level diagnosis: demand is rising faster than capacity. In homelessness, systems‑wide analysis shows local authorities facing increasing crisis presentations driven by housing shortages, welfare constraints and cost‑of‑living pressures. In UKSPF and Multiply, compressed timeframes and short‑term funding cycles created operational strain and restrict innovation.  The Community Ownership Fund interim evaluation suggests that without the fund many pubs, community centres, sports facilities and heritage buildings would likely have been lost from community use, but also highlights long lead‑in times, complex project management demands, and volunteer burnout as recurring challenges.

Prevention consistently outperforms crisis response, but funding architectures still favour the latter

Across homelessness evaluations, the conclusion is clear: prevention is more humane, more effective and delivers better value for money than crisis response. Yet central‑local funding arrangements often reward short‑term, visible ‘rescue’ rather than long‑term preventative investment. Skills and economic development evaluations show similar dynamics. Multiply deep dives find that providers would benefit from multi‑year cycles that allow them to embed contextualised numeracy provision and build trusted relationships. Instead, annualised funding introduces uncertainty and forces a focus on quick (rather than effective) delivery.

The COF evaluation also surfaces a version of this problem. It shows that community ownership has deep preventative value, protecting assets before they disappear, strengthening social infrastructure, and avoiding long‑term local decline. But early rounds of COF were more accessible to groups with high pre‑existing capability, meaning communities most at risk were sometimes least able to prevent asset loss. Later rounds have improved this, lowering match‑funding requirements, widening eligibility, and offering stronger pre‑application support to disadvantaged communities. The lesson resonates across sectors: preventative systems require accessible, stable and equitable funding frameworks.


Local flexibility and community empowerment are major drivers of success

One of the clearest conclusions across the recent evaluations is that local flexibility works. UKSPF’s devolved decision‑making has been widely praised for enabling councils to design interventions aligned to local priorities. Multiply’s flexible design allowed councils to embed numeracy learning in real‑world contexts that resonated with learners.  The COF interim report finds that COF has been “uniquely positioned” to meet community needs, enabling groups to save valued assets and renew pride in place. Communities report increased participation, stronger local identity and early signs of improved social cohesion following COF‑supported interventions.

Workforce, capacity and governance: the quiet constraints shaping outcomes

A recurring thread across the evaluations is the impact of workforce shortages and operational capacity. Staff churn, fragile volunteer bases, rising caseloads and short‑term contracts constrain delivery, limit innovation and prevent organisations from embedding learning. Investing in capacity (skills, governance, leadership and organisational resilience) is critical for successful place‑based policy.

Partnerships make the biggest difference, but they need careful stewardship

From rough sleeping multi‑disciplinary teams to UKSPF delivery partnerships with VCSE organisations, strong collaboration emerges as one of the most important influences on success. Evaluations show that where councils act as effective system convenors (aligning partners, coordinating case management, sharing data and creating shared goals), outcomes improve.

What does all this mean for local government?

Three big implications stand out across the evaluations.

First, councils are increasingly system‑shapers, not simply programme‑managers.  The evaluations underline that successful outcomes depend on how councils orchestrate local systems (such as housing, economic development, VCSE partners and community groups) rather than on the quality of any single programme.

Second, stable, long‑term funding is essential for prevention, equity and innovation.  Short‑term cycles undermine prevention, limit strategic planning and exhaust delivery partners. The COF findings show how programme design changes can increase equity, but also how instability can disadvantage the communities most in need.

Finally, capacity‑building is central to reducing inequality, even when the policy focus is capital investment.  Across the board, councils, community groups and VCSE partners need investment in skills, leadership and organisational resilience. It’s essential that as a sector we develop systematic and accredited processes to deliver the necessary education and training.

The emerging picture is of local government doing extraordinary work under extraordinary pressure. But the future of place‑based policy will depend on giving councils and communities the tools, stability and capacity to shape local systems, rather than firefighting the consequences of systemic constraints.

Next time I will be diving in more detail into what the evaluations tell us about “what works” in tackling homelessness and rough sleeping.

Rewiring Public Spending: Why Place-Based Budgets Are a Game Changer

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Jason Lowther

Today’s announcement of five new pilots of place-based budgets is to be welcomed, particularly if we are able to learn the lessons of previous incarnations of this approach.

For at least two decades, reformers have argued that public money should be organised around people and places rather than the siloed lines of departmental spending. The Total Place pilots at the end of the 2000s offered an early glimpse of what a whole-area approach could achieve: count everything that is spent in a place, identify duplication and misalignment, and then redesign services around users and prevention instead of institutions and costly reactive services. The initiative was short-lived, but it started a body of learning that has grown through subsequent programmes and analyses (Kings Fund 2010; Leadership Centre 2010).

The case for place-based budgets is if anything stronger than in the 2000s. Despite recent increases in funding, local government finance is under intense strain, with parliamentary scrutiny concluding that the funding system is perilously complex and increasingly dominated by mandatory, high-cost services. As demand for social care, homelessness support and special educational needs and disabilities (SEND) has accelerated, councils have had less fiscal room for prevention or early intervention (Public Accounts Committee 2025). Contemporary policy analysis likewise contends that austerity-era dynamics have created a ‘doom-loop’ of short-term firefighting, and that pooling budgets locally and focusing on shared, place-level outcomes offers a realistic route to break it (New Local 2024).

What, then, does the available evidence on place-based budgets demonstrate? I would highlight three key lessons.

First, integration pays. Total Place’s ‘high-level count’ and service ‘deep dives’ gave leaders a common picture of spending, surfacing duplication and transactional costs that fall between organisational boundaries. That visibility enabled local partners to experiment with redesign, supported by cultural work and customer insight, pointing to improved value and user experience, even though formal causal evidence remained emergent due to the initiative’s brevity (Leadership Centre 2010; Kings Fund 2010).

Second, place-based approaches work best as portfolios, not isolated projects. Evaluations of ‘single-pot’ style funding, such as the Local Growth Fund and Getting Building Fund, found synergistic effects when local partners curated integrated suites of interventions, although capacity constraints, time pressure and administrative burdens often limited impact (MHCLG 2025).  To quote: “A place-based approach, underpinned by joined-up strategic planning and strong partnerships, enhanced the effectiveness of interventions, while the flexibility of funding design encouraged innovation”.

Third, process quality matters.  For example, the UK Community Renewal Fund evaluation recorded achievements but highlighted design and delivery lessons, especially around streamlining and enabling local capability (DLUHC 2023).

Each of the service areas targeted in the new pilots have clear potential benefits from place-based budgets. For SEND, with demand surging and statutory duties paramount, money gravitates to crisis responses, while coordination across education, health and care is hampered by mismatched rules and timelines. Fragmentation and pressure are crowding out prevention, strengthening the argument for pooled, place-level budgets with shared outcomes that enable early help (Public Accounts Committee 2025).   For young people at risk of offending, short-term cycles and centralised decision-making weaken continuity and trust (ICON 2025). For adolescent mental health, prevention depends on integrating multiple local services around a common, place-based outcomes framework.  For adults facing multiple disadvantage, evidence from the Troubled Families and similar programmes showed how place‑based, whole‑family approaches can more effectively support adults experiencing multiple disadvantage.

The literature suggests five practical design features. First, begin with a whole-place account of spending, including deep dives where duplication and hand-offs are greatest, then use that map to re-route resource into prevention (Leadership Centre 2010). Second, fix governance and outcomes before money moves: agree a small set of shared, population-level outcomes and decision rules that prevent old silos from re-emerging inside pooled funds (New Local 2024). Third, commit to multi-year settlements; the stop-start rhythms of competitive funds correlate with weaker delivery, thinner partnerships and lost learning (MHCLG 2025; DLUHC 2023). Fourth, invest in local analytical and commissioning capacity. A systematic review of 134 place-based business cases found surprisingly low rates of SMART objectives and limited place-sensitive value-for-money analysis (University of Birmingham 2025). Fifth, align central missions with local flexibility: national outcomes frames can be compatible with local choice on delivery (University of Liverpool 2026).

When budgets follow place and purpose rather than departmental programme labels, partners collaborate more, duplication falls, transaction costs reduce and services are redesigned nearer to the lives they intend to improve. The empirical evidence base is not fully robust since few initiatives have enjoyed the time and design stability that gold-standard evaluations require, but the direction of travel is remarkably consistent across evaluations, parliamentary scrutiny and academic commentary. Building in proper evaluation this time round could really help strengthen this evidence base.

The new pilots are a chance to “stand on the shoulders” of all the hard work local and central governments have done to date, learning the lessons so that this time we can genuinely change the system.

References

Department for Levelling Up, Housing and Communities (DLUHC) (2023) UK Community Renewal Fund evaluation. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-community-renewal-fund-evaluation-report (Accessed 17 March 2026).

ICON (2025) Mapping the Landscape of Place‑Based Initiatives. Available at: https://www.neighbourhoodscommission.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/10957-Mapping-the-Landscape-ICON-Report-V2.pdf (Accessed 17 March 2026).

Institute for Government (2025) The case for Total Place 2.0. Available at: https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/publication/total-place-2.0 (Accessed 17 March 2026).

King’s Fund (2010) Place‑based approaches and the NHS: Lessons from Total Place. Available at: https://assets.kingsfund.org.uk/f/256914/x/74928b3392/place-based_approach_nhs_total_place_event_write-up_2010.pdf (Accessed 17 March 2026).

Leadership Centre (2010) Total Place: A whole area approach. Available at: https://www.leadershipcentre.org.uk/total-place/ (Accessed 17 March 2026).

Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) (2025) Local Growth Fund and Getting Building Fund: Place‑based case studies – Executive summary. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-growth-fund-and-getting-building-fund-place-based-case-studies/local-growth-fund-and-getting-building-fund-place-based-case-studies-executive-summary (Accessed 17 March 2026).

New Local (2024) Place‑Based Public Service Budgets: Making Public Money Work Better for Communities. Available at: https://www.newlocal.org.uk/publications/research-reports/place-based-budgets/ (Accessed 17 March 2026).

Public Accounts Committee (2025) Local Government Financial Sustainability. Available at: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm5901/cmselect/cmpubacc/647/report.html (Accessed 17 March 2026).

University of Birmingham (2025) Business Cases and Place‑Based Funding. Available at: https://blog.bham.ac.uk/lpip/2025/11/26/business-cases-and-place-based-funding/ (Accessed 17 March 2026).

University of Liverpool (2026) Place‑based policy. Available at: https://www.liverpool.ac.uk/media/livacuk/publicpolicyamppractice/innovationsinpublicpolicy/place,based,policy.pdf (Accessed 17 March 2026).

LGOF: CPA-lite or Daily Mail target practice?  

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Jason Lowther

In July, then Local Government Minister Jim McMahon announced a new Local Government Outcomes Framework (LGOF), which (he said) “forms an integral part of this Government’s reforms to ensure we have a sector which is fit, legal and decent”.  These reforms are already pretty extensive, including LG reorganisation, devolution, community engagement, member standards and funding arrangements.

The LGOF framework, the Minister hoped, “will help to put the right checks and balances in place to ensure value for the taxpayer and results for citizens to whom councils are ultimately responsible”.  Given the removal of most systematic monitoring of local performance and outcomes in England with the demise of the Audit Commission a decade ago, is this a new dawn for helpful local insights and intelligent central steering, or the raw material for a crude league table that obscures more than it illuminates?

History shows the difficulty of designing and using performance measures effectively.  Whilst the logic of measuring what matters to inform management (and political) decision making is clear, and there are many examples of successful applications, there are enough examples of failures and unintended negative consequences to encourage caution. 

The immediate precursor to LGOF was a set of measures developed by the ill-fated Office of Local Government (OFLOG).  These were immediately manipulated by the Times newspaper into a league table, labelling Nottingham as the worst council.  The fact that this took place during the pre-election period only made the impact more negative, leading to a stinging letter from the LGA to the then Secretary of State, Michael Gove.  OFLOG was in some ways set up to fail.  Sited inside the Ministry, its political independence was immediately open to challenge.  And reconciling providing local authorities with better data at the same time as acting as an accountability mechanism to central government was always going to be tricky. 

The health service experience of performance measures and targets presents mixed evidence.  It appears that four-hour A&E waiting times targets were associated with reduced mortality, but at the same time there were examples of departments admitting patients near to the time limit at the expense of others more in need of urgent care, a few examples of blatant misrepresentation of figures, and some bizarre holding of patients in ambulances and redefinition of corridors as wards.

Key lessons from these examples include the importance of having a clear focus for the LGOF and the adoption of a broad ‘exploratory’ approach to presenting the performance measures.   As the Institute for Government argued for OFLOG, a key contribution could be making data more consistently available, comparable and usable – and hence supporting evidence-based policy making through the deliberative use of robust evidence.

The LGOF data needs to be presented in ways that enable and encourage exploration and questioning, rather than simplistic league tables which ignore the inherent differences between different councils in terms of population, geography, deprivation, funding, etc.  It therefore needs exhibit what I call the three Cs: to be comparable across councils, contextualised to reflect local circumstances, and citizen-focussed (accessible to lay people).

There are many positive features of the new framework, including its attempt to look at missions and outcomes (rather than just council outputs).  Interested parties had until 12 September 2025 to respond to the Government’s consultation, so we now await the government’s response to that.  Councils can easily see how the proposed LGOF measures look for them using the excellent new LG Inform LGOF report. 

Dr Jason Lowther is Director of the Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV) at the University of Birmingham.  This article was initially published in the Local Area Research and Intelligence Association (LARIA) newsletter. Email [email protected]

Cyclopean ‘local’ government and the end of local democracy?

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Chris Game

As with another quite recent blog of mine, it’s important to start with the alert that most of its style, structure and content stem directly from its having been written in the first instance not for an academic readership, but as a column for probably this week’s Birmingham Post. There are a few additions and subtractions, plus, barring a dramatically uncharacteristic Lowtherian intervention, one guaranteeable difference: the title.

At the time of writing this intro I don’t know for certain what the Post editor’s choice of words and punctuation will be – except that it won’t comprise nine words, including three longish ones. Space and layout, you understand. It will, however – because regular authors do have at least some bargaining ‘say’ – open with that key word that many/most Post readers will barely recognise.

To summarise the whole thing: here in Britain we already have, and in England, following last December’s devolution White Paper, are about to develop still further, a scale of ‘local’ government that makes a complete mockery of the term ‘local’; and the present Government, with no noticeable public consultation, is embarked on increasing that non-local size still further – to truly Cyclopean dimensions.

And, as I sought to explain to the Post editor, by introducing this concept, rarely if ever used in modern political debate, both the Post and I will become – well, you never know – possibly a little bit famous. Here’s the reasoning.

First, ‘Cyclopean’, used in the context of local government.  Ancient Greek, pretty obviously, it originally described an architectural style in which the walls, towers and other fortifications of ancient cities like Mycenae (a 70-odd mile day trip SW of Athens) were constructed from massive limestone boulders – of the scale shown in the accompanying illustration – fitted extremely closely together without apparently having been substantially reshaped and without use of mortar or cement. 

So preternaturally impressive were these city constructions – the hilltop Mycenae was perhaps the most famous, but there were numerous others – that the myth developed that they must have been built by the Cyclopes, a race of superhuman giants in Greek mythology, and the only humans physically capable of creating such constructions. Hence ‘Cyclopean’ – to describe the assumed method and scale of a city’s governmental architecture, not the size of its residential population.

Somehow, though, towards the latter end of the 3,500 intervening years, the UK has developed, to an almost unique degree, its own interpretation of ‘Cyclopean local government’. Yes, there are loads of large buildings – Birmingham’s Council House and Central Library for starters, the Octagon, etc. – but there’s no Cyclopean mystery about what holds them together. Put crudely, it’s the concrete and steel, not some mystical manpower.

The UK’s, and particularly England’s, modern-day local government and its latest structural ‘reform’ have become almost entirely about scale. Instead of referring to the governance of, or provision of services for, a particular local community and its unique character, England’s ‘Cyclopean local government’ currently comprises just over 300 ‘local’ authorities, with populations averaging 180,000 – which is hardly our (or anyone’s) ‘everyday’ usage and understanding of that term ‘local’.

And yes, averaging. Which, of course, would make Birmingham’s 1.2 million population ‘super-Cyclopean’ – and the West Midlands Combined Authority’s 4 million ‘Mega-Cyclopean’. Or ‘hyper-Cyclopean’, which I personally slightly prefer, suggesting something beyond the bounds of reason, or control. We’ll return to that.

Some quick comparisons or contrasts: average size of German and Italian municipalities is around 7,500, Spain’s 5,700, and France, albeit as exceptional in its way as the UK, 1,900. Yes, slightly under one-hundredth the size of our average, and, by chance, roughly the same as our smallest, the Isles of Scilly, arguably our one ‘municipality’ that wouldn’t make a mockery of the term ‘autorité locale’.

The rest of the world, or first-time observers, find our scale figures as extraordinary as the Ancient Greeks found Mycenae. They are naturally curious as to how we do anything purporting to be genuinely ‘local’ government on such a manifestly non-local scale, and, above all, why.  Good questions, but not for a local newspaper column. Indeed, not for the likes of us mere citizens and voters either, because no one’s bothering to ask us.

The major redesign of England’s local government is currently in the hands of Angela Rayner – Deputy Prime Minister + (in any spare time) Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government.  An early action was to cancel – arguably “legally risky”, if not unconstitutionally (see Google– ‘Cancellation of 2025 English local elections’) – nine May 2025 county and unitary council elections, she/someone in the Government having decided that these bodies had had their day and there would be no room for them in her new, but still undefined, single-tier England.

Rightly describing the UK as the “most centralised” country in Europe (https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cn0xz4938z9o), Rayner’s apparent plan is to end central government’s micro-management by making ours, by a distance, the least localised – most Cyclopean – ‘local government’ certainly in Europe, if not the world (500,000 minimum), and, it would appear, without a great deal of consultation.

The ’plan’, in summary, represents the biggest and most transformative upheaval of English local government in my adult lifetime (sorry, you’ll have to work it out!), rushed/bullied through Parliament and local government itself with absolutely minimal consultation and consequential analysis. In short, modern-day Cyclopean local government.

Chris Game is an INLOGOV Associate, and Visiting Professor at Kwansei Gakuin University, Osaka, Japan.  He is joint-author (with Professor David Wilson) of the successive editions of Local Government in the United Kingdom, and a regular columnist for The Birmingham Post.

Picture credit: https://stock.adobe.com/uk/images/odysseus-und-seine-gefahrten-fluchten-vor-dem-zyklopen-polyphem/608942497