The etymology of quangos – and academic self-effacement

Chris Game

Initialisms (abbreviations pronounced as individual letters) are obviously necessary and useful, but acronyms, properly defined (abbreviations pronounced as words), are surely more fun. That’s always been my rule of thumb, anyway. Actually, fun’s perhaps not the best word, especially as examples I’ve occasionally used include HIV/AIDS: HIV – initialism for Human Immunodeficiency Virus; AIDS – acronym for Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome.

I suppose “seem cleverer” is what I really mean, because, in politics anyway, most of the big acronyms, while undoubtedly worthy, are so familiar as to be almost boring: NASA, NATO, OPEC, WASP – though I quite like POTUS, as I imagine President Trump himself does. And at least they’re easier to remember or work out – easier than certainly some initialisms like, say, LGBT, LGBTQI, or is it LGBTQIA+ (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, Intersex, Asexual, all other)?

In modern-day UK politics there are only two acronyms I can think of offhand, unless you count voting for RON – the rather pleasing democratic mechanism, largely confined to Students Union elections, allowing voters to choose not to elect any candidate in an election, but instead to vote for ‘RON’ and then, if ‘he’ wins, for a Re-Opening of Nominations and the process to start again, until one candidate achieves at least half of the votes and is elected.

As nearly happened this year, incidentally, for the Presidency of Trinity College Dublin Students’ Union. Not quite, though, and, while the eventual winner reckoned she had “no actual words to describe” her feelings, she most certainly found a few for her acceptance speech, which I equally most certainly won’t repeat here.

My Acronym No.2 is UKIP – the Eurosceptic, right-wing populist UK Independence Party, founded in the early 1990s and so labelled in 1993. All of which is leading to precisely … ? The Government’s promised/threatened abolition of all Acronym No.1s, of course: QUANGOS – Quasi-Autonomous Non-Governmental Organisations. OK, I know it’s not perfect, but it’s surely the best-known example.

You’ll doubtless have seen the various, and by no means co-ordinated, media announcements over the past week or so: that “Ministers could introduce legislation to abolish a swathe of quangos [nice concept in itself: a swathe of quangos!] in one go, as part of the Government’s plans to restructure the state and cut thousands more civil service jobs …. [and are] considering a Bill that will speed up the reorganisation of more than 300 arm’s-length organisations that between them spend about £353bn of public money.”

It’s apparently not quite as arbitrary as some of the early reports made it sound. As reported in The Guardian (April 6th): Pat McFadden, the Cabinet Office minister, has written to every Whitehall department, asking them to provide “compelling justification” for the existence of each ‘quango’ or risk [it] being closed, merged, or having its powers brought back into the department.

Just like NHS England, possibly the world’s biggest quango, whose 15,000 staff were judged collectively to have failed the self-justification test, as it was the first to be scrapped, and that, “under the control of ministers, [will apparently] avoid duplication, bring greater accountability and save [unspecified amounts of] money”.

There’s an enormous amount to be studied and written about these developments, but not here. The sole purpose of this blog is precisely that set out in the title: to remind readers of what, to the best of my knowledge, is the etymology of ‘Quangos’ – not least because it involves an erstwhile academic colleague of mine.

When I first started ‘studying’ UK Government in the 1960s, at the Universities of Manchester (undergrad) and Essex (post-grad), Quangos simply didn’t exist – or, rather, they weren’t labelled, categorised and studied as such. That evolution took place during the 1970s, by which time I’d moved on, eventually to Birmingham and INLOGOV.

Leaving behind, inter alia, a former colleague who, by his own, invariably self-effacing, admission, was the actual author of our Quango acronym: Anthony/Tony Barker – though he, accurately, if pedantically – called it a near-acronym. If you need confirmation, though, just try Wiki-Quango-History: “The term ‘quasi non-governmental organization’ was created in 1967 by the Carnegie Foundation’s Alan Pifer …The term was shortened to the acronym QUANGO by … Anthony Barker, a Briton, during one of the conferences on the subject”.

It’s something to be rather proud of, you might think. If it had been me, I feel I’d regret it if, say, a whole week passed, at least during term time, without my somehow managing to ease it into some lecture/seminar/casual conversation or other. “I’ve just paid my TV license – £174.40! Outrageous – it’s just another Quango, you know”. “Did you see that bit in the papers about how they’ve found a way of possibly eliminating HS2’s ‘sonic boom’? It’s actually a Quango, you know?” “Yes, as it happens, I did invent the name.”

Yet Tony Barker, almost from the outset, was dismissive of something that he felt was overused, thereby misused, and “as useless as it is inelegant”. He goes into more detail in his 1979 book, Quangos in Britain, comprising mainly the papers delivered at a conference he convened on ‘The World of Quasi-Government’, describing the “near-acronym which I derived from a rather roundabout (and originally American) technical term ‘quasi-governmental organisation”.

But here’s the thing. Even in these early accounts, while not actually disowning the term and his authorship, he was his own severest critic – seeming almost to blame himself for creating a term that others have stretched to the point of near-meaninglessness – “they may be talking about any kind of body which has a definite relationship to the government or to local government”. I can’t help wondering what he’s thinking now, as the Government’s abolition programme gets underway.

Chris Game is an INLOGOV Associate, and Visiting Professor at Kwansei Gakuin University, Osaka, Japan.  He is joint-author (with Professor David Wilson) of the successive editions of Local Government in the United Kingdom, and a regular columnist for The Birmingham Post.

Tackling social problems: why don’t we do ‘what works’?

Jon Bright

One of the most significant problems in public policy has been the persistent failure to draw on evidence of “what works”—and, perhaps more crucially, what doesn’t.

Despite a growing interest in evidence-based policy, we still have a long way to go in identifying and scaling up successful practice. Take, for example, the findings from Nesta’s 2013 report, which revealed that only three out of seventy programmes implemented by the Department of Education were well evaluated (1). Sadly, this gap in evidence was not confined to education and still applies today (2).

Public sector managers need to know what works, what doesn’t and where they should experiment intelligently. However, until the late 1990s, there was little emphasis on evidence as a basis for policy and we haven’t moved as fast as we should have since then. As a result, we have been slow to innovate, evaluate, and scale up new ideas that add value.

What have been the consequences?

That’s not to say there haven’t been some stellar examples of innovation. But these have usually been down to exceptional people or circumstances. In most public organisations, knowledge of best practice is either lacking or hard to access. Public sector managers, particularly outside of professional disciplines, often lack the skills to assess evidence or adapt successful policies to different contexts. In some cases, even when they are aware of evidence, politicians may override advice in favour of projects shaped by political pressure, ideology, or personal interest.

As a result, we keep reinventing policies rather than refining and improving them over the longer term. This makes it much harder to tackle persistent social problems. What’s worse, some policies have been introduced despite evidence that they probably wouldn’t work (3). And even when successful programs are found, we struggle to replicate or scale them up in different contexts.

The Challenges of Policy Transfer and Scaling

This is the core of the problem. A good example is the attempt by English police forces in the early 2000s to replicate a successful gang violence reduction program from the US. Unfortunately, they ignored the detail underpinning the most important components of the US model and the results were largely unsuccessful (4).

In contrast, Strathclyde Police in Scotland carefully adapted the model and successfully reduced gang-related violence. Between 2004 and 2017, the murder rate in Strathclyde halved, and the rate of knife crime dropped by 65%. This example underscores the importance of understanding not only what works, but why it works and how it can be adapted to local contexts (5).

Scaling up successful interventions presents additional difficulties. Long-term success depends on increased funding which is rarely guaranteed. Family Nurse Partnerships (FNPs), for example, have been shown to be effective but have only benefited a small fraction of eligible children in the U.K., despite their positive impact on school readiness and early education outcomes (6). There must be a better way.

Why Is This Still a Problem?

There are several reasons why doing ‘what works’ is a difficult nut to crack. not least of which is the political environment in which decisions are made. Politicians may also reject evidence-based proposals for understandable reasons: cost, public opposition or concern about how they will land with colleagues and the media. Sometimes the timing’s just not right.

Moreover, public sector organisations are often risk-averse. Innovation requires a supportive culture, special funding, expertise, and incentives—elements that are frequently absent. On the plus side, the requirement to produce a business case for new policies does encourage the search for evidence.
The most common objection to evidence-based policy is that we often don’t have the evidence. I deal with this below.

Finally, until recently, there have been too few organisations charged with bringing evidence to decision-makers.

The What Works Centres

The good news is there has been some progress. Ten independent ‘what works’ centres have been set up in recent years to provide evidence-based guidance to policymakers. These centres, covering areas such as health, education, crime, homelessness, ageing and children’s social care, help to bridge the gap between research and practice (7). Their role is to provide unbiased, rigorous, and practical advice to help public services become more effective (8).

However, the work is far from complete. While the centres have made significant strides, there is no agreed, systematic way of incorporating ‘what works’ into the development of policy and delivery of services. Additionally, there has been no independent review of the centres’ overall impact on public policy in the 10 +years since they were founded.

What next for What Works?

The Centre for Public Impact (CPI) argues that a lot of evidence simply isn’t robust enough as the sole basis for social policy (9). It suggests we should use the term ‘evidence-informed’ alongside ‘evidence-based’ and proposes a combination of evidence, expertise, and experience as the best bet for designing policies that will work in most places.
Evidence-informed practice – Centre for Public Impact

To progress the evidence-based policy agenda, five points need to be addressed:

  1. Government Commitment: Government should invest more in research and development. While private companies like Volkswagen allocate a substantial portion of their budget to R&D, most government departments spend less than 1%. Senior civil servants must also be better equipped to understand and apply evidence-based policies (10).
  2. Local Government Involvement: Much of the ‘what works’ conversation takes place at the national level. Local government and civil society must be more involved to ensure better policy and bigger impact. The Welsh Centre for Public Policy is thought effective because of its close working with the devolved government.
  3. The Limits of Evidence: Often, evidence is incomplete or not easily applied to specific contexts. Furthermore, while the Centres are good at synthesising evidence, they don’t take account of the politics of policy making. Local policy makers often query the relevance of evidence when it doesn’t address their main policy questions (11). Evidence often needs to be combined with professional expertise and local experience to tailor policies to local needs.
  4. Scaling Up Good Practice: Public sector organisations need better systems for integrating successful new approaches into their mainstream services. This reduces the need for special funding. Similarly, successful programmes should be repackaged in a form that makes them easier to replicate at scale (12).
  5. Support for Local Managers and Practitioners: User-friendly, evidence-based information is crucial. For example, the Education Endowment Foundation assesses interventions based on evidence strength, cost and impact. This helps schools make good decisions. Other centres also provide ‘what works’ toolkits (13)

During 2024/25, there have been developments in the Network. For example, the Centre for Local Economic Growth has advised local authorities and emphasised tailored interventions that consider local contexts and needs. The Centre for Children’s Social Care has been recommending practices to improve outcomes for children in care. There has been greater collaboration among the Centres including a unified digital platform to disseminate findings. Looking ahead, new centres on climate resilience and digital inclusion are anticipated. The UK government has renewed its funding to the Network.

The ‘what works’ movement is a major step forward in improving public policy. To maximize its impact, its leadership needs to be refreshed, local government and civil society better engaged, and systems created to incorporate successful practice into mainstream services.

Jon Bright is a former civil servant who worked in the Cabinet Office and Department of Communities and Local Government between 1998 and 2014.

References

  1. Cited in The What Works Network (2018) The What Works Movement Five Years On. P15.
  2. Mulgan. G and Puddick. R, (2013) Making evidence useful- the case for new institutions, National Endowment for Science, Technology and the Arts (NESTA).
    See also Institute for Government event in October 2022 ‘What works’ in Government: 10 years of using evidence to make better policy. At this event, David Halpern commented that only 8% of sample of Government programmes had evaluation plans in place.
  3. Wolchover. N, (2012) Was DARE effective? Live Science 27.3.2012; and College of Policing (2015) Scared Straight Programmes, Crime Prevention Toolkit.

4. Knight. G, (2009) How to really hug a hoodie. Prospect. November 2009. See also, Tita. G, Riley. J,
Ridgeway. G, and Greenwood. P, (2005) Reducing Gun Violence Operation Ceasefire. National Institute of Justice (USA); and Braga. A. Kennedy. D, Waring. E, Morrison Piehl. A, (2001) Problem-oriented policing, deterrence, and youth violence: an evaluation of Boston’s Operation Ceasefire. National Institute of Justice.

5.Big Issue (2020) How Scotland’s’ Violence Reduction Unit breaks the cycle of crime, Big Issue 11.9.2020;
Craston. M, et al, (2020) Process evaluation of the Violence Reduction Units Home Office Research Report 116, August 2020; O’Hare. P, (2019) How Scotland stemmed the tide of knife crime, BBC Scotland news website, 4 March 2019; and Batchelor. S, Armstrong. S, and MacLellan. D, (2019) Taking Stock of Violence in Scotland, Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research August 2019.

  1. National Institute of Health Research (2021) Family Nurse Partnerships Building Blocks 5-6 study.
  2. Gov.UK (2013, updated 2022) What Works Network, Evaluation Task Force. https://www.whatworksnetwork. org.uk/
  3. The What Works Network (2018) The What Works Movement Five Years On.
    See also Breckon. J, and Mulgan. G, (2018) Celebrating Five Years of the UK What Works Centres, NESTA.
  4. Snow. T, and Brown. A, (2021) Why evidence should be the servant, not the master of good policy Centre for Public Impact.10.8.2021
  5. Halpern, D presentation at an Institute for Government (2022) event op cit.
  6. Private correspondence with Jason Lowther, Head of INLOGOV.
  7. Little. M, (2010) Improving children’s outcomes depends on systemising evidence-based practice… Demos
  8. Education and Endowment Foundation – Teaching and learning toolkit. An accessible summary of education evidence https://educationendowmentfoundation.org.uk/